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[D]espite [the claimant’s] valiant effort to frame the suit as one for
declaratory or injunctive relief, this kind of litigation should be
understood for what it is. At bottom it is a suit for money for which the
Court of Federal Claims can provide an adequate remedy, and it
therefore belongs in that court.
Judge S. Jay Plager1
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
issued a series of opinions2 clarifying the jurisdictional priority of the United States
Court of Federal Claims (CFC) under the Tucker Act (which authorizes non-tort
money claims against the United States)3 over a variety of claims against the
federal government that are essentially means to a monetary end. In these cases,
plaintiffs had cleverly or mistakenly transformed financial disputes into requests
for injunctive or declaratory relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)4
that purportedly could be filed in U.S. District Court.
Because the APA expressly excludes judicial review in District Court when an
“adequate remedy” lies in another court,5 the Federal Circuit has repeatedly
confirmed that the CFC retains its traditional and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
claims against the federal government that are adequately remedied by a money
judgment. The Federal Circuit’s leading jurisdictional decisions, emphasizing the
sufficiency of a money judgment in the CFC to resolve claims that are essentially
pecuniary in nature, have arisen in such varied contexts as an objection by nuclear
utilities to government assessments for costs in decontaminating uranium
processing facilities;6 a claim by a federally subsidized, low-income housing
project that the government breached a contract by refusing to permit adequate
rental increases, which in turn led to foreclosure on the housing project’s federally
insured mortgage;7 and efforts by a lender to force assignment to and obtain
reimbursement from the government on a defaulted nursing home mortgage under a
federal mortgage guarantee program.8
In recent years, the jurisdictional tug-of-war between the Court of Federal
Claims (under the Tucker Act) and the District Court (under the APA) has been
most sharply featured in the adjudication of a series of breach of trust claims
presented by individual Native Americans and American Indian tribes against the
federal government. While the governing principles and jurisdictional lines drawn
in statutory waivers of sovereign immunity and accompanying jurisdictional
enactments generally apply across the wide diversity of disputes involving the
federal government, the problem of forum shopping has emerged most prominently
in Indian breach of trust litigation since the late 1990s.
Since the enactment of the Indian Tucker Act in 1946 (which authorizes money
claims by Indian tribes against the United States),9 the Court of Federal Claims has
been the forum for Indian breach of trust claims alleging the United States

2. See infra Part I.C.
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006 & Supp. II 2009); infra Part I.A.
4. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2006).
5. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
6. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 247 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
7. Christopher Vill., L.P. v. United States, 360 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
8. Suburban Mortg. Assocs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 480 F.3d 1116
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006).
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government’s failure to uphold its fiduciary responsibilities in managing Native
American funds and resources. The Supreme Court’s landmark Indian breach of
trust decisions over the past several decades have been rendered in cases that began
in the CFC or its predecessors.10 In recent years, the Federal Circuit has reaffirmed
the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFC over Indian breach of trust claims alleging
government mismanagement of Native American funds.11
The venerable understanding that Indian breach of trust claims involving
individual or tribal assets are to be pursued as claims for money in the CFC was
disturbed by an aberrational decision, Cobell v. Babbit,12 issued a little more than a
decade ago by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and later
affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In that
case, the District Court asserted authority under the APA to adjudicate the
management and evaluate the records of government-established financial
accounts, which were used to distribute to individuals the profits derived from
Native American resources held in trust by the United States.13
In assuming jurisdiction over the Cobell case, the District Court aggressively
extended the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Bowen v. Massachusetts14—a
unique case arising from the federal-state administration of the Medicaid health
care program that the Supreme Court had found unsuited for review in the CFC.15
Although the Cobell complaint was framed as a request for an historical financial
accounting of individual Indian trust accounts, the case always was about missing
money, as eventually confirmed by the 2010 congressionally approved $3.4 billion
settlement of the Cobell litigation.16
In the years following the District Court jurisdictional ruling in Cobell, dozens
of other Indian tribes followed suit (pun intended) by lodging their complaints in
District Court. In these cases, the tribes reformulated Indian breach of trust
disputes—that previously would have been destined for the CFC as claims for a
money judgment—into equitable requests for an accounting of trust assets that
purportedly could be filed instead in District Court.17 Indeed, to justify pursuit of
breach of trust claims in District Court, these tribes denigrated the ability of the

10. See, e.g., United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003);
United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S.
206 (1983). See infra Part II.B.1.
11. See E. Shawnee Tribe of Okla. v. United States, 582 F.3d 1306, 1308–09 (Fed. Cir.
2009), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011).
12. 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24–28 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d sub nom. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d
1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. 487 U.S. 879 (1988).
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291, 124 Stat. 3064. On the
settlement, see generally infra notes 167–168 and accompanying text.
17. See Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Norton, 527 F. Supp. 2d 130, 130–32 (D.D.C.
2007) (listing cases).
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CFC to provide full relief in such cases,18 notwithstanding that other tribes have
continued to pursue remedies for breach of trust solely in the CFC.19
To add to the jurisdictional chaos, several tribal plaintiffs not only filed breach
of trust claims in District Court seeking an accounting and monetary restitution, but
simultaneously filed parallel breach of trust lawsuits in the CFC that forthrightly
sought money damages under the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act.20 Because
28 U.S.C. § 1500 bars the CFC from taking jurisdiction if the plaintiff “has pending
in any other court any suit or process against the United States” that is “for or in
respect to” the same “claim,”21 the filing of these duplicative suits created an even
more immediate and direct jurisdictional collision.
In 2011, in United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation,22 the Supreme Court
reiterated that lawsuits filed in the CFC must be dismissed under § 1500 if parallel
litigation is pending in District Court.23 Reading § 1500 as “a robust response” to
the burdens of duplicative litigation against the United States,24 the Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff may not maintain one lawsuit in the CFC while a second
lawsuit is proceeding in another court that arises out of the same operative facts,
even if the two lawsuits seek wholly different relief.25
Although the direct question before the Supreme Court in Tohono was the force
of the CFC jurisdictional bar in § 1500, the Court’s analysis sheds light on the
underlying question of the proper forum for claims that ultimately seek or could be
satisfied by a money judgment available under the Tucker Act in the CFC.26 In
rejecting the plaintiff’s claim of hardship by being limited to a single forum, the
Tohono Court observed that the plaintiff “could have filed in the CFC alone and if
successful obtained monetary relief to compensate for any losses caused by the
Government’s breach of duty.”27
In another decision from the same term, United States v. Jicarilla Apache
Nation,28 the Court clarified the limits on tribal requests for information from the
federal government, specifically rejecting common-law trust theories as a basis for
demanding government documents.29 Indian breach of trust claims brought under
the APA in District Court have been premised on a supposed independent cause of

18. See Brief for Respondent at 11, 34, 46, United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation,
131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011) (No. 09-846) (arguing that the CFC cannot provide “full relief”
because it cannot direct an accounting of tribal assets).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011) (resolving
discovery dispute in ongoing Indian breach of trust litigation brought in CFC); Jicarilla
Apache Nation v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 726, 731–38 (Fed. Cl. 2011) (holding that
tribal trust account statutes create a fiduciary duty by the government to the tribe).
20. See infra Part III.A.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (2006).
22. 131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011).
23. See infra Part III.A.
24. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1725, 1728.
25. Id. at 1727–31.
26. See infra Part III.B.
27. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1730–31.
28. 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011).
29. Id. at 2318, 2330.
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action for an accounting under the inherent equitable authority of the federal courts,
a theory that is no longer viable after Jicarilla Apache.30
In light of these judicial developments, attempted detours from the CFC in cases
arising from monetary disputes with the federal government—in Indian breach of
trust cases or otherwise—should be coming to an end.31 For example, but for the
mistaken argument that District Courts have broader remedial powers in Indian
breach of trust cases through inherent equitable authority, Native American tribes
and individuals would have had less incentive to bypass the Tucker Act and Indian
Tucker Act remedies available in the CFC, which include both money and
collateral equitable-type relief.32 Indeed, the monetary and collateral relief authority
of the CFC offers a fuller and richer set of remedies to Native Americans who
establish breach by the United States of fiduciary duties, especially in contrast to
the increasingly doubtful and limited accounting remedy in District Court.
Accordingly, no reason remains to file parallel Indian breach of trust claims in both
courts, either simultaneously or successively.
With the exclusive jurisdictional authority of the CFC being confirmed directly
and indirectly by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit for cases arising from
what essentially are pecuniary disputes, this Article concludes that the § 1500
problem has evaporated for many types of suits. For claims in which ultimate
recovery of money from the United States is the essence, recent rulings in both the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit confirm that, when “[a]t bottom it is a suit
for money,” then “the Court of Federal Claims can provide an adequate remedy,
and it therefore belongs in that court.”33
I. THE COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS AND THE ADEQUACY OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
A. The Court of Federal Claims and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Money Claims
Against the United States
What today is known as the United States Court of Federal Claims “shared its
birth with that of the first significant grant of permission by the sovereign United
States to its citizens to seek relief against it in the courts.”34 In 1855, Congress
created the United States Court of Claims and gave it authority to hear claims
against the United States founded upon federal statutes, regulations, and
contracts.35 In 1887, the Tucker Act36 was enacted to confirm the nationwide
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over money claims (other than in tort) based on

30. See infra Part II.B.3.
31. See infra Part III.B.
32. See infra Part II.B.2.
33. Suburban Mortg. Assocs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 480 F.3d 1116,
1118 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
34. GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT § 4.02(a)(1), at 226
(4th ed. 2006).
35. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612.
36. Tucker Act of 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505.
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federal statutes, executive regulations, and contracts, while also expanding the
court’s authority to include monetary actions based on the Constitution.37
In 1982, through the Federal Courts Improvement Act,38 Congress divided the
original Court of Claims into two related entities: (1) the Claims Court, which
henceforth would serve as the trial forum for Tucker Act and certain other claims
against the federal government, including government contract claims;39 and (2) the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which would be the
appellate court with jurisdiction over Tucker Act case appeals generally and over
cases from the Claims Court specifically.40
The Claims Court was designated as an “Article I court”41—that is, a court
created by Congress pursuant to its legislative powers under Article I of the
Constitution and whose judges do not have the life-tenure protection guaranteed to
members of the regular federal judiciary by Article III of the Constitution.42
In 1992, the Claims Court was renamed the “United States Court of Federal
Claims”43 (CFC), the denomination that it retains today.
The Tucker Act is a jurisdictional statute that also waives the federal
government’s sovereign immunity from suit and authorizes monetary claims
“founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of
an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”44
Trial court jurisdiction over “Big” Tucker Act claims against the United States is
assigned by § 1491(a)(1) to the CFC. District Courts retain concurrent jurisdiction
over Tucker Act claims for $10,000 or less under § 1346(a)(2), which is commonly
known as the “Little” Tucker Act.45

37. Id. § 1. See generally Richard H. Seamon, Separation of Powers and the Separate
Treatment of Contract Claims Against the Federal Government for Specific Performance, 43
VILL. L. REV. 155, 176–77 (1998).
38. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). On the Federal Courts Improvement Act and
the creation of the then-Claims Court, see generally Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543, 545, 585–87
(2003).
39. See § 105(a), 96 Stat. at 26–28.
40. Id., §§ 127, 165, 96 Stat. at 37–38, 50.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2006).
42. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988). But see SISK, supra note 34, § 4.02(a)(3), at 231–
32 (arguing “that the Court of Federal Claims should be integrated more fully into the
Judicial Branch by formally [being designated with] Article III status,” and that “[g]iven that
a judge of the Court of Federal Claims upon expiration of his or her fifteen-year term may
become a senior judge and thereby continue to act in a judicial capacity and receive a full
salary, the court already has been given de facto Article III status by Congress”).
43. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902, 106 Stat.
4506, 4516 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
44. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491(a)(1) (2006).
45. On the “Big” and “Little” Tucker Acts, see generally SISK, supra note 34, § 4.02(b),
(c), at 236–39.
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The Tucker Act remains the “foundation stone” in the adjudication of non-tort
money claims against the United States.46 Congress has designated the CFC as the
forum for demands against the public treasury, relying on its expertise with
appropriations and other money-mandating statutes and its experience in
adjudicating complex cases involving fiscal matters, financial transactions, and
public monetary obligations.47 Among those matters falling under the purview of
the CFC are government contract formation issues, military employment claims,
Indian trust claims, vaccine claims, and takings of private property.48
Traditionally, the CFC was understood to have authority to award only
monetary relief against the United States.49 In recent decades, Congress has granted
to the CFC meaningful and considerable, although limited, remedial powers
beyond awarding a money judgment. Most importantly for present purposes, in
1972, Congress enacted the Remand Act50 as an amendment to the Tucker Act,
authorizing the CFC “[t]o provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief
afforded by the judgment” by granting certain equitable-type relief attached to a
money judgment, including “correction of applicable records.”51 Thus, when a
plaintiff has a meritorious claim for a money judgment, the CFC also has the
remedial power to grant certain non-monetary relief that is “incident of and
collateral to” the money judgment.52
Among the other matters on its diverse docket, the CFC long has served as
Congress’s chosen forum for adjudicating financial and property disputes that arise
from the nation’s responsibilities to indigenous peoples. In 1946, Congress enacted
the Indian Tucker Act, which, as amended, directs the exercise of jurisdiction by
the CFC—
in favor of any tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American
Indians residing within the territorial limits of the United States or
Alaska whenever such claim is one arising under the Constitution, laws
or treaties of the United States, or Executive orders of the President, or
is one which otherwise would be cognizable in the Court of Federal
Claims if the claimant were not an Indian tribe, band or group.53
With the enactment of the Indian Tucker Act, it would “never again be
necessary to pass special Indian jurisdictional acts in order to permit the Indians to
secure a court adjudication on any misappropriations of Indian funds or of any

46. C. Stanley Dees, The Future of the Contract Disputes Act: Is It Time to Roll Back
Sovereign Immunity?, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 545, 546 (1999).
47. See SISK, supra note 34, § 4.02(a)(4), at 235.
48. See id. at 232–36; Seamon, supra note 38, at 548–49.
49. See, e.g., United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969); United States v. Jones, 131
U.S. 1, 9, 14–18 (1889).
50. Remand Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-415, 86 Stat. 652 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1491(a)(2) (2006)).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2).
52. Id.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006) (originally enacted as the Indian Claims Commission Act,
ch. 959, Pub. L. No. 79-726, § 24, 60 Stat. 1049, 1055 (1946)).
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other Indian property by Federal officials that might occur in the future.”54 The
Supreme Court’s landmark Indian breach of trust decisions over the decades have
been rendered on review of claims originally filed in the CFC or its predecessors.55
B. Jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims After the Supreme Court’s Decision
in Bowen v. Massachusetts
When considering amendments to the APA in 1976, Congress sought to pull
together the “patchwork” of various statutory waivers of federal sovereign
immunity in the hopes of regularizing this area of law and reducing confusion.56 By
providing that the APA applies only to actions “seeking relief other than money
damages”57 and where “there is no other adequate remedy in a court,”58 Congress
designed the APA to be complementary with the Tucker Act—not overlapping or
conflicting.59 In this way, as I have written previously, Congress has “woven a
broad tapestry of authorized judicial actions against the federal government,” which
“fit together into a reasonably well-integrated pattern of causes of action covering
most subjects of dispute between the government and its citizens.”60
In Bowen v. Massachusetts,61 decided in 1988, the Supreme Court allowed a
singular type of plaintiff to bring a peculiar claim for monetary relief under the
APA framework rather than under the purview of the Tucker Act. Many feared that
the Court had thereby blurred the lines between the APA and the Tucker Act,62
which is also the jurisdictional border between the District Courts and the CFC.63

54. 92 CONG. REC. 5313 (1946) (statement of Rep. Jackson). On the Indian Tucker Act
and breach of trust claims, see generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §
5.05[1][b], at 426–33 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005 ed.); Gregory C. Sisk, Yesterday
and Today: Of Indians, Breach of Trust, Money, and Sovereign Immunity, 39 TULSA L. REV.
313, 316–17 (2003).
55. See, e.g., United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 469 (2003);
United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 500 (2003); United States v. Mitchell, 463
U.S. 206, 210 (1983); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 288–89 (1942).
56. See Massachusetts v. Departmental Grant Appeals Bd., 815 F.2d 778, 782–83 & n.3
(1st Cir. 1987).
57. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
58. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
59. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 11 (1976) (“The explicit exclusion of monetary relief
[from the amendment to the APA leaves] . . . limitations on the recovery of money damages
contained in . . . the Tucker Act . . . unaffected.”); see also Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table
Grape Comm’n, 655 F.3d 1337, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“When Congress amended section
702 in 1976, it made it clear that it did not intend that amendment to have any effect on the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over suits for money damages falling within the
jurisdiction of that court.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Claims Court at the Crossroads, 40
CATH. U. L. REV. 517, 527 (1991) (“Congress clearly seems to have contemplated that there
can be no suit in federal district court if the suit can instead be brought in the Claims Court
under the Tucker Act.”).
60. Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity
and Money Claims Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 603 (2003).
61. 487 U.S. 879 (1988).
62. See, e.g., Marcia G. Madsen & Gregory A. Smith, The Court of Federal Claims in
the 21st Century: Specific Proposals for Legislative Changes, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824,
829–30 (2003) (describing Bowen as “upset[ting] . . . fundamental understandings” about
CFC and District Court jurisdiction). For a detailed description and general critique of
Bowen, see Sisk, supra note 60, at 618–27.
63. The APA does not provide an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to the
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In dissent in Bowen, Justice Scalia feared that “the jurisdiction of the Claims
Court has been thrown into chaos.”64 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit later observed that, through Bowen, “the barrier [between the
APA/District Court and the Tucker Act/CFC] sprang a leak, a leak that has
threatened to become a gusher.”65
In Bowen, the Supreme Court examined a challenge filed by the State of
Massachusetts in District Court to the federal government’s disallowance of a
reimbursement for certain health care expenditures under the matching payment
provisions of the Medicaid statute.66 The state invoked the authority of the District
Court under the APA, to which the government objected by citing § 702, which
explicitly excludes actions seeking “money damages.”67 The Supreme Court
majority, however, held that the “money damages” exclusion in § 702 of the APA
refers to claims seeking compensation for a loss.68 By contrast, the Bowen majority
held that when money is “the very thing” to which a party is entitled,69 that money
may be claimed in an action for specific relief under the APA:
The State’s suit to enforce § 1396b(a) of the Medicaid Act, which
provides that the Secretary “shall pay” certain amounts for appropriate
Medicaid services, is not a suit seeking money in compensation for the
damage sustained by the failure of the Federal Government to pay as
mandated; rather, it is a suit seeking to enforce the statutory mandate
itself, which happens to be one for the payment of money.70
In dissent in Bowen, Justice Scalia, joined by two other justices, relied on a
distinction in the common law between a money judgment, which is “damages,”
and a non-monetary prospective remedy, thus concluding that a claim for
retrospective monetary relief falls outside the scope of the APA.71 Although leaving
undisturbed the Bowen court’s narrow definition of “money damages” for purposes
of § 702 of the APA, Justice Scalia subsequently incorporated the common-law
approach into the majority opinion for the Court in Great-West Life & Annuity
Insurance Co. v. Knudsen,72 a case arising under the Employment Retirement
federal courts. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 106–07 (1977). When a claim falls
inside the scope of the APA’s limited waiver of federal sovereign immunity, then the general
federal-question jurisdictional statute typically confers jurisdiction on the District Court. See
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
64. 487 U.S. at 930 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. Suburban Mortg. Assocs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 480 F.3d 1116,
1122 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
66. Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396v (2006).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
68. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 891–901.
69. Id. at 895.
70. Id. at 900 (emphasis in original); see also Colleen P. Murphy, Money as a
“Specific” Remedy, 58 ALA. L. REV. 119, 131, 152 (2006) (explaining that because “the
plaintiff had an original entitlement under [the] statute that the government pay money,” the
Bowen Court “correctly decided that the monetary remedy the plaintiff sought was specific
relief,” while maintaining that the author’s purpose was “not to question whether the
Supreme Court in Bowen interpreted the APA correctly with respect to district court
jurisdiction over challenges to agency action”).
71. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 913–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
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Income Security Act (ERISA).73 In Great-West Life, Justice Scalia quoted from his
Bowen dissent to reject a party’s characterization of a request for an injunction to
pay money as “equitable relief” authorized under ERISA:
Almost invariably . . . suits seeking (whether by judgment, injunction,
or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the
plaintiff are suits for “money damages,” as that phrase has traditionally
been applied, since they seek no more than compensation for loss
resulting from the defendant’s breach of legal duty.74
In Bowen, the Court majority also rejected the government’s argument based on
§ 704 of the APA, which authorizes judicial review under the APA only when
“there is no other adequate remedy in a court.”75 The government contended that an
alternative adequate remedy in the form of monetary relief was available against
the United States in the then-Claims Court under the Tucker Act.76 Highlighting the
special nature of the Medicaid financial participation arrangement between the
federal government and the State of Massachusetts, the Court majority stated:
[T]he nature of the controversies that give rise to disallowance
decisions typically involve state governmental activities that a district
court would be in a better position to understand and evaluate than a
single tribunal headquartered in Washington. We have a settled and
firm policy of deferring to regional courts of appeals in matters that
involve the construction of state law. That policy applies with special
force in this context because neither the Claims Court nor the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has any special expertise in considering
the state-law aspects of the controversies that give rise to disallowances
under grant-in-aid programs. It would be nothing less than remarkable
to conclude that Congress intended judicial review of these complex
questions of federal-state interaction to be reviewed in a specialized
forum such as the Court of Claims.77
Moreover, the Court found it “anomalous to assume that Congress would channel
the review of compliance decisions to the regional courts of appeals . . . and yet
intend that the same type of questions arising in the disallowance context should be
resolved by the Claims Court or the Federal Circuit.”78
On the § 704 “adequate remedy” exclusion, Justice Scalia dissented as well,
saying that “even though a plaintiff may often prefer a judicial order enjoining a
harmful act or omission before it occurs, damages after the fact are considered an
‘adequate remedy’ in all but the most extraordinary cases.”79 He questioned the
majority’s reasoning that a complex and ongoing federal-state relationship merited

73. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2006).
74. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 210 (quoting Bowen, 487 U.S. at
918–19 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
76. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 901–08.
77. Id. at 907–08.
78. Id. at 908 (internal citation omitted).
79. Id. at 925 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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special consideration. Instead, Justice Scalia suggested that the area of law involved
in the Medicaid program was no more complex than those subjects routinely
handled in the then-Claims Court, that the federal government’s relationship with
the states was not peculiarly intricate, and that the dispute was one of federal law
that did not implicate state-law questions.80
Whatever the merits of allowing APA review in district court in the federal-state
Medicaid partnership context, the Bowen majority never suggested that the APA
could be used to bypass the CFC for traditional money claims against the United
States. Subsequently, in Department of the Army v. Blue Fox,81 the Court
unanimously reversed the extension of Bowen by one Court of Appeals to allow a
subcontractor on a federal project to impose an “equitable lien” on funds held by
the United States.82 Holding that liens “are merely a means to the end of satisfying
a claim for the recovery of money,” the Court held that this remedy fell within the
exclusion under the APA of actions for “money damages.”83 Thus, the Court has
recognized that lawsuits and remedial devices that traditionally have been designed
to recover money should be recognized for what they are in substance—money
claims.
In essence, the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Massachusetts focused on a dispute
over an ongoing public welfare program arising from a unique federal-state
partnership relationship and held it was ill-suited for a Tucker Act suit in the CFC.
The Court rejected what it called “the novel proposition that the Claims Court is the
exclusive forum for judicial review” of Medicaid program disputes.84 Accordingly,
as Professor Cynthia Grant Bowman and other scholars suggest, the “most likely
interpretation” of Bowen is that it does not “transfer matters traditionally within the
exclusive jurisdiction” of the CFC.85
Writing nearly a decade ago, I characterized Bowen as “a notorious and
remarkably far-reaching example” of a judicial decision that threatened to
“unravel” the largely harmonious “tapestry” of statutes that authorized suits against
the United States.86 Surveying the legal landscape at that time, from military and
civilian employment claims to government contract and Indian trust claims—all
matters that traditionally had fallen under the Tucker Act or related statutes in the
CFC and outside of the APA in District Court—I worried aloud that the lower

80. Id. at 928–29.
81. 525 U.S. 255 (1999).
82. Id. at 261–64.
83. Id. at 262–63.
84. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 883.
85. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Bowen v. Massachusetts: The “Money Damages
Exception” to the Administrative Procedure Act and Grant-in-Aid Litigation, 21 URB. LAW.
557, 577 (1989) (arguing that Bowen should be limited to grant-in-aid programs); see also
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 930 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting the courts “may have the sense”
to “limit [the decision] to the single type of suit before us”); Michael F. Noone, Jr. & Urban
A. Lester, Defining Tucker Act Jurisdiction After Bowen v. Massachusetts, 40 CATH. U. L.
REV. 571, 603 (1991) (arguing Bowen should be “limited to those suits where a state claims
that the Federal Government erred in ruling that a program was ineligible for grant-in-aid
reimbursement”).
86. Sisk, supra note 60, at 603.
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courts were falling into disarray, with Bowen “creating confusion and inconsistency
and enhancing the opportunity for forum-shopping by litigants.”87
Fortunately, as explained above and in the immediately following subsection of
this Article, my worst fears that Bowen would be widely misapplied by lower
courts to slowly dissolve CFC authority proved pessimistic. Decisions by both the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have reaffirmed the institutional integrity of
the CFC over money claims and largely stabilized the jurisdictional doctrine.88
Even in the specific field of Indian breach of trust claims, where the most marked
departure from established jurisdictional rules had occurred in the District Court,89
the Supreme Court now has arrested the flow of duplicative litigation in both the
district court and CFC while emphasizing the fullness of the CFC monetary
remedy.90 Together with the Federal Circuit’s continued clarification of Tucker Act
jurisdiction and the adequacy of a money judgment to resolve financially centered
disputes with the federal government, the stage has been set for a return of Indian
breach of trust litigation to the CFC for complete adjudication with an ample set of
remedies for the meritorious case.91
In sum, the Supreme Court has never suggested that traditional Tucker Act
claims—government contract disputes, military employment claims, or Indian
breach of trust claims involving government management of assets—could be
diverted from the CFC to the District Court as purported claims for specific relief
under the APA. The Bowen court itself described the § 704 bar to judicial review in
District Court when an “adequate remedy” lies elsewhere as “mak[ing] it clear that
Congress did not intend the general grant of review in the APA to duplicate
existing procedures for review of agency action.”92 For those types of claims that
traditionally have fallen under the Tucker Act in the CFC an “adequate remedy” is
available in the form of a money judgment and collateral equitable relief. For those
claims the CFC has exclusive jurisdiction.
C. The Federal Circuit’s Confirmation of Exclusive Jurisdiction in the Court of
Federal Claims When a Money Judgment is Adequate
When the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in
1982, Congress intended for it to exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
nontax Tucker Act claims in order “to provide reasonably quick and definitive
answers to legal questions of nationwide significance.”93 Specifically, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(3) grants jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit over all appeals from the
Court of Federal Claims.94 Additionally, § 1295(a)(2) confers appellate jurisdiction
upon the Federal Circuit over District Court decisions “if the jurisdiction of that

87. Id. at 606.
88. See supra Part I.B. and infra Part I.C.
89. See infra Part II.A.
90. See United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011). See generally
infra Part III.B.2.
91. See infra Parts II.B.2, III.B.2.a–b.
92. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903 (1988).
93. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3 (1981).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (2006).
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court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1346[(a)(2)] of this title,”95 that is,
the Little Tucker Act.
In United States v. Hohri,96 the Supreme Court examined the comprehensive
framework of the Federal Circuit’s organic statute and noted the strong
congressional expressions of the need for uniformity in the area of Tucker Act
jurisprudence:
A motivating concern of Congress in creating the Federal Circuit was
the “special need for nationwide uniformity” in certain areas of the law.
S. Rep. No. 97–275, p. 2 (1981) (hereinafter 1981 Senate Report); S.
Rep. No. 96–304, p.8 (1979) (hereinafter 1979 Senate Report). The
Senate Reports explained: “[T]here are areas of the law in which the
appellate courts reach inconsistent decisions on the same issue, or in
which—although the rule of law may be fairly clear—courts apply the
law unevenly when faced with the facts of individual cases.” 1981
Senate Report, at 3; 1979 Senate Report, at 9. The Federal Circuit was
designed to provide “a prompt, definitive answer to legal questions” in
these areas. 1981 Senate Report, at 1; 1979 Senate Report, at 1. Nontort
claims against the Federal Government present one of the principal
areas in which Congress sought such uniformity.97
In 1988, in the immediate aftermath of and as a direct response to Bowen v.
Massachusetts,98 Congress authorized a special interlocutory appeal to the Federal
Circuit when what should be framed as a Tucker Act claim arguably has been misfiled in the District Court, thus potentially undermining the jurisdictional integrity
of the CFC. In 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4), Congress granted a right to an immediate
interlocutory appeal by either the plaintiff or the government from a District Court
ruling “granting or denying, in whole or in part, a motion to transfer an action to
the United States Court of Federal Claims under” 28 U.S.C. § 1631.99 In this way,
jurisdictional questions may be resolved at the outset of litigation, avoiding
wasteful litigation on the merits in the wrong trial court. To “ensure uniform
adjudication of Tucker Act issues in a single forum,” the interlocutory appeal is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.100
In a series of decisions, the Federal Circuit has emphasized “[r]espect for the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims” over monetary claims.101 In

95. Id. § 1295(a)(2).
96. 482 U.S. 64 (1987).
97. Id. at 71–72 (alterations in original).
98. 487 U.S. 879 (1988); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 52, 54 (1988) (describing
Bowen as creating “an uncertain exception to the general principle that monetary claims
against the United States must proceed under the Tucker Act”).
99. Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 501, 102 Stat. 4652 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(d)(4)(A)). During my service as an appellate attorney in the Civil Division of the
Department of Justice, I drafted this legislation enacted by Congress to encourage early
resolution of questions about the respective jurisdiction of the District Court and the CFC.
See Gregory C. Sisk, Tucker Act Appeals to the Federal Circuit, 36 FED. B. NEWS & J. 41
(1989).
100. H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 52 (1988).
101. Christopher Village, L.P. v. United States, 360 F.3d 1319, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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each of these cases, claimants against the United States sought to bypass the CFC
by seeking injunctive or declaratory relief in District Court, even though the
gravamen of the dispute was monetary and a money judgment would be an
adequate remedy for a meritorious claim. Deprecating the post-Bowen v.
Massachusetts development of “a sort of cottage industry among lawyers
attempting to craft suits, ultimately seeking money from the Government, as suits
for declaratory or injunctive relief without mentioning the money[,]”102 the Federal
Circuit has stabilized the jurisdictional doctrine and reaffirmed the integrity of the
CFC in claims ultimately grounded in a financial dispute with the United States.103
First, in Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States Department of Energy,104
nuclear utilities brought suit in District Court against the federal government
challenging the constitutionality of statutory assessments against utilities for the
government’s costs in decontaminating and decommissioning uranium processing
facilities.105 The utilities sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was
unconstitutional and an injunction against continued enforcement of the
assessments.106 The government moved to transfer the case to the CFC, asserting
that adequate relief in the form of a refund of prior assessments would be available
through the Tucker Act if the plaintiff utilities were successful on the merits.107
After the district court denied transfer and asserted authority under the APA, with
citation to Bowen v. Massachusetts, the government took an interlocutory appeal to
the Federal Circuit under § 1292(d)(4).108
In Consolidated Edison, the Federal Circuit concluded that the CFC could offer
an adequate remedy, thus depriving the District Court of authority under the
APA.109 Although the nuclear utilities may have avoided the “money damages”
exclusion in § 702 of the APA by seeking only prospective relief, the District Court
nonetheless was deprived of jurisdiction under § 704 of the APA because the CFC
was empowered to provide an effective remedy.110 If the utilities were successful in
a suit for refund of previously paid assessments under the Tucker Act in the CFC,
that judgment would operate by principles of res judicata to preclude the
government from continuing unlawful assessments in the future. Thus, because
“[r]elief from its retrospective obligations will also relieve it from the same
obligations prospectively[,]” the CFC through a money judgment “can supply an
adequate remedy even without an explicit grant of prospective relief.”111 The court

102. Suburban Mortg. Assocs., v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 480 F.3d 1116,
1124 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
103. See Mary Ellen Coster Williams, 2007 Government Contract Decisions of the
Federal Circuit, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (2008) (describing Suburban Mortgage, one
of the Federal Circuit’s clarifying rulings, as “a watershed decision that should do much to
eliminate wasteful litigation on the jurisdictional divide between district courts and the
COFC”).
104. 247 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
105. Id. at 1380–81.
106. Id. at 1381.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 1382.
109. Id. at 1380, 1382–86.
110. Id. at 1382–85.
111. Id. at 1384–85.
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thus rejected the utilities’ “blatant forum shopping to avoid adequate remedies in an
alternative forum.”112
With respect to Bowen v. Massachusetts,113 the Federal Circuit in Consolidated
Edison noted that the Supreme Court had “emphasized the complexity of the
continuous relationship between the federal and state governments administering
the Medicaid program.”114 The Federal Circuit explained that when a case does not
involve “a complex ongoing federal-state interface,”115 the CFC can supply an
adequate remedy through a money judgment.116
Next, in Christopher Village, L.P. v. United States,117 the Federal Circuit
confirmed its Consolidated Edison precedent, giving it further emphasis and
broader reach. The Christopher Village court declared void a ruling by another
Court of Appeals in the same case as having been issued without proper
jurisdiction. Owners of a federally subsidized, low-income housing project
challenged the government’s foreclosure of the federally insured mortgage on the
property, which had substantially deteriorated, arguing that the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had breached contracts with the project
by refusing to permit adequate rental increases.118 The plaintiffs filed suit in
District Court under the APA seeking a declaratory judgment that the government
was liable for breach of contract.119 After the District Court ruled in favor of the
government, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed,
finding that the government had breached a contractual duty to entertain the request
for rental increases.120 The plaintiffs then turned around and filed suit for damages
in the Court of Federal Claims, presenting the Fifth Circuit’s ruling as establishing
the existence of a breach as a matter of res judicata and thus leaving only the
amount of damages to be determined.121
On appeal from a summary judgment ruling for the government in the CFC, the
Federal Circuit in Christopher Village reiterated that “a litigant’s ability to sue the
government for money damages in the Court of Federal Claims is an ‘adequate
remedy’ that precludes an APA waiver of sovereign immunity in other courts.”122
The court confirmed its understanding that the Bowen v. Massachusetts decision,
which permitted an action against the government involving a monetary dispute to
proceed in District Court, was tied to the specific circumstances of that case—an
ongoing matter with the potential for prospective relief involving the sensitive
relationship between the federal and state governments.123

112. Id. at 1385 (citations omitted).
113. 487 U.S. 879 (1988); see supra Part I.B.
114. Consolidated Edison, 247 F.3d at 1383.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1385.
117. 360 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
118. Id. at 1333.
119. Id. at 1323.
120. Id. at 1324.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1327; see also Telecare Corp. v. Leavitt, 409 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“The availability of an action for money damages under the Tucker Act or Little Tucker Act
is presumptively an ‘adequate remedy’ for § 704 purposes.”).
123. Christopher Village, 360 F.3d at 1328 n.2.
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In Christopher Village, the Federal Circuit emphasized that a District Court does
not have jurisdiction “to issue a declaratory judgment as to the government’s
liability for breach of contract solely in order to create a ‘predicate’ for suit to
recover damages in the Court of Federal Claims.”124 The court thereby rejected the
relegation of the Court of Federal Claims into a paymaster certifying an award of
damages as directed by another court. Because the District Court’s exercise of
jurisdiction in the prior related case (and thus that of the Fifth Circuit on appeal
from that court) infringed upon the authority of another tribunal (the CFC), the
Federal Circuit ruled in Christopher Village that neither it nor the CFC were bound
to follow the earlier judgment in any respect.125
In Suburban Mortgage Associates, Inc. v. United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development,126 the Federal Circuit confirmed that if the plaintiff’s
claim, however framed, actually seeks a monetary reward from the government,
such that a judgment in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act will give
the plaintiff essentially the remedy he seeks, then the CFC is the only proper forum.
In Suburban Mortgage, a lender sought to assign a note and mortgage, on which a
nursing home had defaulted, to HUD under a federal mortgage guarantee
program.127 Because the government asserted fraud, given that the same individual
allegedly owned or controlled both the lender and the nursing home, HUD refused
to accept the assignment.128
The lender filed suit in District Court, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, the APA, and the Declaratory Judgment Act.129 Essentially, the lender
sought a declaratory judgment or specific performance on the mortgage guarantee
agreement with HUD—that is, an order to HUD to accept assignment of the note
and mortgage. The government moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or alternatively for transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 to the CFC,
contending that the suit was a contract action under the Tucker Act.130 The District
Court ruled that the lender’s claim was permissible under the APA as a request for
specific relief in the form of money, citing to Bowen v. Massachusetts, and further
that the CFC could not provide an adequate remedy because injunctive relief was
necessary to redress the lender’s concerns about possible bankruptcy, loss of
reputation, and loss of future profits.131
On interlocutory appeal in Suburban Mortgage, the Federal Circuit rejected this
attempt at an end-run around both the Tucker Act and the Court of Federal
Claims.132 To “thwart such attempted forum shopping,”133 the court explained that
if the substance of the claim is one for money, then the Tucker Act remedy in the
Court of Federal Claims is presumptively adequate.134 Accordingly, the District

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 1321.
Id. at 1329–33.
480 F.3d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1118–19.
Id. at 1119 & n.6.
Id. at 1119.
Id.
Id. at 1119–21.
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1124–26.
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Court lacked authority under § 704 of the APA (whether or not this type of
monetary relief fell under the “money damages” exclusion in § 702 of the APA).135
In the case at hand, the Federal Circuit had little difficulty concluding that the
lender, in essence, was seeking the financial benefit of the agreement with HUD
under the mortgage-guarantee contract.
The lender in Suburban Mortgage insisted that the CFC remedy was inadequate,
because the CFC could not grant equitable relief. But the Federal Circuit reiterated
its understanding from Consolidated Edison and Christopher Village that the
Bowen v. Massachusetts adequacy of remedy holding turned on the complexity of a
continuous relationship between two sovereigns—the United States and the State of
Massachusetts.136 The Suburban Mortgage case involved no complex or even
ongoing relationship.137 Moreover, any money judgment entered by the CFC would
control the government’s future related behavior through principles of collateral
estoppel.138 The Federal Circuit concluded the opinion by reminding the District
Courts around the country that when it comes to the Tucker Act, the court that
ultimately may decide the matter is the Federal Circuit.139 Thus, while District
Courts properly look to the law of the regional circuits for guidance, they may be
well-advised to pay attention to the precedent of the Federal Circuit as well.140
The Federal Circuit’s most recent ruling on the contours of CFC jurisdiction in a
rather idiosyncratic context reflects no retreat from those earlier decisions that had
emphasized the primacy of the CFC over money claims against the United States.
In Nebraska Public Power District v. United States (NPPD),141 the Federal Circuit
sitting en banc held that review by the D.C. Circuit under the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982142 of the Department of Energy’s failure to establish a repository site
for spent nuclear fuel did not encroach on the jurisdiction of the CFC.143 The
Federal Circuit reached this conclusion even though the D.C. Circuit also issued a
writ of mandamus directing the process of contractual remedies for nuclear utilities
that had contracted with the Department to accept spent nuclear fuel.144
Critics of the NPPD decision fear that it “has the potential to reshape the
jurisdictional landscape significantly by further diminishing the CFC’s exclusive

135. Id.; see also Thomas J. Madden, John F. Pavlick Jr., Rebecca E. Pearson, Terry L.
Elling, Sharon A. Jenks, W. Patrick Doherty, Dismas N. Locaria & James Y. Boland, 2007
Year in Review: Analysis of Significant Federal Circuit Government Contract Decisions, 37
PUB. CONT. L.J. 625, 666 (2008) (explaining that “[i]f the answer is yes” to the question of
whether the CFC can provide an adequate remedy under the Tucker Act, “then the inquiry
ends, as the district court will only have jurisdiction [under the APA] in the absence of an
adequate remedy at COFC”); Williams, supra note 103, at 1080 (saying that by focusing on
the adequate remedy factor of APA § 704 rather than the money damages exclusion of
§ 702, “the Federal Circuit deferred the inquiry on whether relief sought was for money
damages vel non to a later, perhaps unnecessary phase of the analysis”).
136. Suburban Mortgage, 480 F.3d at 1127.
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1128.
140. Id.
141. 590 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
142. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2006).
143. NPPD, 590 F.3d at 1368–76.
144. Id. at 1365–76.
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jurisdiction.”145 Whenever “statutory provisions influence the interpretation of the
government contracts they authorize,” Daniel Thies warns that “[c]reative lawyers”
may seek statutory review in other federal courts, thereby undermining the
exclusive jurisdiction of the CFC over government contracts.146 Judge Gajarsa
dissented in NPPD, viewing the approval of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling as
“infring[ing] upon the Court of Federal Claims’s exclusive Tucker Act jurisdiction
over the administration of contract disputes, thereby impacting the sovereign
immunity of the United States and undermining this court’s duty to review the
contract decisions of the Court of Federal Claims.”147 Given that agency statutes
sometimes include special jurisdictional provisions for particular matters,148 broad
interpretation of such jurisdictional statutes to encompass contractual or money
damages matters could progressively erode the CFC’s Tucker Act jurisdiction.
Whatever the merits of the Federal Circuit’s particular analysis in NPPD, the
court’s ruling is grounded in the singular and complicated nuclear waste legislation,
which includes a specific jurisdictional provision for review in the regional Court
of Appeals of the department’s actions regarding a repository for spent nuclear
fuel.149 The Federal Circuit emphasized that the D.C. Circuit’s ruling on contractual
remedies was merely an “implementation of its statutory ruling”150 and “did not
impermissibly invade the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.”151
Importantly, all members of the en banc Federal Circuit in NPPD—the majority,
the concurrence, and the dissent—affirmed the continued force of the landmark
Consolidated Edison and Christopher Village decisions, even though the judges
disagreed on the application of those precedents to the unique context of review
under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.152
In sum, as the Federal Circuit has consistently confirmed, when a retrospective
monetary remedy is available, it is “adequate” absent extraordinary circumstances,
notwithstanding the unavailability of prospective or equitable remedies. Any
judgment by the CFC awarding monetary relief for past breaches of a duty will
deter the federal government from repeating that conduct in the future, both as a
matter of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) as to the particular litigants and as a
matter of precedent as to other concerned entities, especially if the CFC judgment
is reviewed by the Federal Circuit which has nationwide appellate jurisdiction and
thus can establish Tucker Act jurisprudence with nationwide precedential effect.

145. Daniel Thies, The Decline of the Court of Federal Claims in Nebraska Public Power
District v. United States, 590 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1203,
1211 (2010).
146. Id. at 1213. But see Steven L. Schooner, A Random Walk: The Federal Circuit’s 2010
Government Contracts Decisions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1067 (2011) (defending the NPPD
decision).
147. NPPD, 590 F.3d at 1377 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).
148. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3612(i) (2006) (providing for review in the regional circuit of
agency orders regarding alleged discriminatory housing practices).
149. See NPPD, 590 F.3d at 1371; id. at 1377 (Dyk, J., concurring); id. at 1379, 1384–85
(Gajarsa, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 1365.
151. Id. at 1376.
152. Id. at 1371; id. at 1377 (Dyk, J., concurring); id. at 1379, 1384–85 (Gajarsa, J.,
dissenting).
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II. DISTRICT COURT V. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS: THE JURISDICTIONAL TUG-OFWAR IN INDIAN BREACH OF TRUST CLAIMS
A. The Unprecedented Projection of District Court Authority Over Money Disputes
in Cobell v. Babbitt
In 1996, a class action lawsuit on behalf of more than 300,000 Native
Americans was filed as Cobell v. Babbitt in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia, alleging that the United States had failed to account for billions of
dollars earned on oil and logging leases of millions of acres of land allotted to
American Indians over a century ago but held in trust by the federal government.153
When the government, during discovery, failed to turn over records for Indian trust
accounts promised by Department of Justice lawyers, the district judge took the
extraordinary step of holding several leading officials, including the Secretary of
the Interior, in contempt.154
After a bench trial in 1999, the District Court found that the government had
kept such poor records that it was incapable of determining what it owed each
individual Native American or, for that matter, even which individuals owned
which allotments of land.155 The court concluded:
The United States’ mismanagement of the [Individual Indian Money]
trust is far more inexcusable than garden-variety trust mismanagement
of a typical donative trust. For the beneficiaries of this trust did not
voluntarily choose to have their lands taken from them; they did not
willingly relinquish pervasive control of their money to the United
States. The United States imposed this trust on the Indian people.156
The District Court retained continuing jurisdiction over the matter, including
periodic review of the government’s ongoing efforts to prepare a full historical
accounting of the trust.157
In 2002, still dissatisfied with the progress of the Department of Interior in
performing an historical accounting of allotment accounts, the district judge issued
a new contempt citation to another cabinet secretary in a new administration, based
upon findings of deception and abject failure in continuing efforts to reform the
trust system.158 However, on this occasion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the district judge had overstepped his
authority, reversing the contempt citation as improperly holding the Secretary
responsible for the conduct of her predecessor in office and rejecting the finding
that the secretary had committed fraud on the court through deceptive status

153. See Cobell v. Babbitt, 30 F. Supp. 2d 24, 28 (D.D.C. 1998); Cobell v. Babbitt, 188
F.R.D. 122 (D.D.C. 1999).
154. Cobell v. Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6, 38 (D.D.C. 1999).
155. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1088–90 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 6–12 (D.D.C. 1999).
156. Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d. at 6.
157. Id. at 58–59.
158. Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19–20 (D.D.C. 2002).
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reports.159 Moreover, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the District Court had clearly erred
in reappointing a monitor who had been invested “with wide-ranging extrajudicial
duties over the Government’s objection.”160
At this point, Congress intervened by enacting legislation to temporarily relieve
the Department of Interior from conducting the expensive and burdensome
historical accounting ordered by the District Court in Cobell—legislation that the
D.C. Circuit upheld on appeal as constitutional161—while Congress sought to
develop a comprehensive legislative solution to the trust account problem. When
that legislative suspension expired by its own terms at the end of 2004 without
congressional resolution, the district judge characterized the congressional action as
“a bizarre and futile attempt at legislating a settlement of this case,”162 promptly
reinstated the structural injunction ordering the government to conduct a complete
historical accounting of the trust fund accounts, and announced the intention to
conduct further contempt proceedings related to the case.163
In 2006, the D.C. Circuit reversed additional orders by the district judge as
exceeding judicial authority and then punctuated its ruling by ordering the action
assigned to a different judge.164 The D.C. Circuit ruled that the district judge had
“exceeded the role of impartial arbiter,” had leveled serious charges against Interior
and its officials unrelated to the issue before the court, and had become so extreme
in “professed hostility to Interior” as to display a clear inability to render a fair
judgment.165 In 2009, the D.C. Circuit once again overturned the District Court,
which through a new judge had concluded that an accounting was not possible and
had instead ordered payment by the government of $455 million as a “restitutionary
award.”166
Finally, in December 2010, Congress approved a $3.4 billion settlement that had
been reached between the parties, of which $1.4 billion would compensate Indian

159. Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128, 1148–50 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Judge Lamberth’s Reign of Terror at the Department of Interior, 56 ADMIN. L.
REV. 235 (2004) (arguing that the district judge’s propensity for threatening contempt
citations against government employees that the judge regarded as misbehaving had initiated
a “reign of terror” by a runaway federal judge, creating chaos within the Department of
Interior, destroying morale throughout the agency, costing the government huge sums of
money, abusing scores of federal employees, and inhibiting effective reform of the Indian
trust system).
160. Cobell, 334 F.3d at 1142.
161. Cobell v. Norton, 392 F.3d 461, 465–68 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
162. Cobell v. Norton, 357 F. Supp. 2d 298, 306 (D.D.C. 2005).
163. Id.
164. Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
165. Id. at 335.
166. Cobell v. Kempthorne, 569 F. Supp. 2d 223, 226 (D.D.C. 2008), rev’d sub nom.
Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808, 809–10 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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trust account beneficiaries for their trust mismanagement claims.167 The settlement
was finalized by the District Court in July 2011.168
Even at its close, the case engendered controversy, when the Cobell plaintiffs’
attorneys asked the District Court to award $223 million in fees to be paid from the
settlement,169 despite having signed a settlement agreement (which was presented
to Congress in asking for legislative approval of the overall settlement) in which
plaintiffs agreed that they “shall not assert that Class Counsel be paid more than
$99,900,000.00.”170 Given that most individual Native American beneficiaries of
the settlement would receive less than $2,000,171 the fee request drew sharp
criticism from many Native Americans. The National Congress of American
Indians adopted a resolution supporting new legislation to cap the fees at $50
million in the Cobell case and declaring that the $223 million sought by the
plaintiffs’ lawyers “is considered outrageous by many in Indian Country and as a
breach of their fiduciary duty to the class by putting their own interests ahead of the
class, and has resulted in intense bipartisan scrutiny and criticism.”172 In the end,
the District Court approved fees for the plaintiffs’ attorneys of $99 million.173
As I have said previously about Cobell,
[s]omewhat lost in the story of egregious government misconduct and
adjudication of high-ranking government officials in contempt is the
fact that the jurisdiction of the District Court—rather than the Court of
Federal Claims—over the entire matter was doubtful and only possible
through a generous reading of the Bowen v. Massachusetts decision.174
Indeed, the course of the litigation and its ultimate resolution confirm that the case
always was about money—how the United States was obliged as a fiduciary to
manage Indian money accounts, how the government mishandled funds held in

167. Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291, 124 Stat. 3064 (2010); see also
Background on President Obama’s Claims Resolution Act Signing Ceremony Today,
(Dec.
8,
2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressWHITEHOUSE.GOV,
office/2010/12/08/background-president-obamas-claims-resolution-act-signing-ceremony-today
(describing the $3.4 billion settlement of the Cobell litigation).
168. Order Granting Final Approval to Settlement, Cobell v. Salazar, No.
1:96CV01285(TFH) (D.D.C. July 27, 2011), aff’d, 679 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
169. Plaintiffs’ Petition for Class Counsel’s Fees, Expenses and Costs Through
Settlement at 3, Cobell v. Salazar, No. 1:96CV01285(TFH) (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2011).
170. Agreement on Attorneys’ Fees, Expenses, and Costs ¶ 4.a, Cobell v. Salazar, No.
1:96CV01285-JR, (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2009).
171. Rob Capriccioso, Judge Grants Cobell Settlement Final Approval, INDIAN COUNTRY
(June 21, 2011), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/06/judge-grants-cobellsettlement-final-approval/.
172. Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, Resolution #MKE-11-019 Supporting the Native American
Rights Fund’s Request for Attorney’s Fees and H.R. 887, at 2 (June 13-16, 2011), available at
http://www.ncai.org/attachments/Resolution_ImcaJlXsxXplZObIyXugJUzxaEkKSFELNyuHV
xVYRJiPgQGDKID_MKE-11-019_final.pdf.
173. Order Granting Final Approval to Settlement at 9–10, Cobell v. Salazar, No.
1:96CV01285(TFH) (D.D.C. July 27, 2011), aff’d., 679 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
174. Sisk, supra note 60, at 661.

104

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:83

trust, and how much the government should pay to restore funds to those accounts
and compensate for its failures.
From the beginning, the District Court in Cobell asserted authority over the
matter under the APA, claiming the power to grant retrospective relief in the nature
of an historical accounting of the accrued, past-due sums of money that should be
present in individual Indian trust accounts. Quoting Bowen v. Massachusetts, the
court said that the plaintiffs sought “‘the very thing to which they are entitled,’ an
accounting of their money that actually exists in the [Individual Indian Money]
trust.”175 In a terse paragraph, the D.C. Circuit later upheld this holding, with
citation to Bowen, by ruling that the plaintiffs’ request for an accounting constituted
“specific relief other than money damages” which the district court had authority to
hear under the APA.176
Turning away the argument that the case belonged in the Court of Federal
Claims as a money judgment claim under the Tucker Act, the District Court in
Cobell said that the “crucial issue” was “whether the plaintiffs’ requested
retrospective remedy of an accounting is an equitable, specific claim, or whether it
is simply a money damages claim in disguise.”177 Faced with questions about the
amenability of the APA for their Indian breach of trust suit, the plaintiffs belatedly
denied that they were asking for any “cash infusion” into the accounts “to
recompense the plaintiffs for lost or mismanaged funds”178 and “disavowed seeking
an order for the payment of money in this case.”179 Because the complaint actually
had sought broad financial relief, the District Court performed cosmetic surgery to
strike from the complaint those allegations that explicitly sought monetary relief
beyond the parameters of the APA.180 “At most,” the District Court concluded, “the
enforcement of this statutory right [to an accounting] may partially support some
future monetary claim (but not necessarily ‘money damages’), which, because this
is plaintiffs’ own money, will only be compensatory to the extent that the money is
missing from the trust.”181
Writing nearly a decade ago, I maintained that the Cobell case ultimately was
about money and, therefore, belonged in the Court of Federal Claims:
The Cobell plaintiffs did not seek an accounting from the government
because they value bookkeeping exactitude in the abstract or appreciate
the intrinsic beauty of a well-prepared financial statement. Rather, they
sought an accounting for the practical purpose of hastening the day that
the government will be called to account for—that is, required to pay—
the money that it has wrongfully withheld.182

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 28 (D.D.C. 1999) (citation omitted).
Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1094–95 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Cobell v. Babbitt, 30 F. Supp. 2d 34, 39 (D.D.C. 1998).
Id. at 39–40.
Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 27.
Cobell, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 40 & n.17.
Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 28.
Sisk, supra note 60, at 664 (emphasis in original).
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Like the “equitable lien” device that the Supreme Court refused to countenance
under the APA in Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.,183 the accounting of
Native American trust accounts requested in Cobell was “merely a means to the
end of satisfying a claim for the recovery of money.”184
Time has served only to confirm that portrayal.
In the beginning, as the Cobell lawsuit got underway, the District Court declared
that there was no evidence that the true nature of the plaintiffs’ claims was to obtain
eventual monetary reimbursement.185 Accepting the plaintiffs’ assertions that they
sought no payment of money and no infusion of cash into Indian trust accounts, the
Cobell court proclaimed that “[t]hese facts belie any claim that the plaintiffs’
requested remedy is for money damages.”186
In the end, however, with resolution of the litigation by the $3.4 billion
settlement, the underlying pecuniary nature of the case became transparent. What
the plaintiffs had repeatedly insisted they were not seeking—any cash infusion into
the accounts or any order for the payment of money—proved to be exactly what the
plaintiffs sought and received. Indeed, in the plaintiffs’ petition for an award of
attorney’s fees as part of the final settlement of the Cobell case, they forthrightly
relied on “[t]he size of the fund and number of class members benefited” to justify
a request for $223 million in attorney’s fees, characterizing “the $3.4 billion
settlement [as] the largest class action award against the government.”187
Moreover, although little noticed inside the legislation approving the Cobell
settlement, the parties apparently recognized and took extraordinary steps to
address the possible jurisdictional infirmity of the Cobell litigation, effectively
conceding that the claim truly was one that otherwise would fall under the Tucker
Act. In legislative language proposed by the parties and enacted by Congress, the
Claims Resolution Act of 2010 provides that “[n]otwithstanding the limitation on
the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States in section 1346(a)(2) of
title 28, United States Code, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia shall have jurisdiction of the claims asserted in the Amended Complaint
for purposes of the Settlement.”188 The reference to § 1346(a)(2) is to the Little
Tucker Act,189 which allows claims for money judgments in the District Court only
up to $10,000, while claims above $10,000 must be pursued in the CFC.
In this way, the settlement legislation acknowledges that the Cobell requests for
relief under the settlement sought a money judgment under the Tucker Act, and the
legislation then lifts the $10,000 limit on Tucker Act claims in District Court for
this particular lawsuit.190 Notably, no pretense was made in the final resolution of

183. 525 U.S. 255, 262 (1999); see also supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
184. Blue Fox, 525 U.S. at 262.
185. Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 25–26.
186. Cobell v. Babbitt, 30 F. Supp. 2d 24, 41 (D.D.C. 1998).
187. Plaintiffs’ Petition for Class Counsel’s Fees, Expenses and Costs Through
Settlement at 20, Cobell v. Salazar, No. 1:96CV01285(TFH) (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2011).
188. Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291, § 101, 124 Stat. 3064, 3066–
67 (2010).
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2006).
190. As part of the settlement proceedings in the District Court, the plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint that expressly requested “restitution, damages, and other appropriate
legal and equitable relief.” Amended Complaint at 24, Cobell v. Salazar, No. 1:96 CV
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the Cobell litigation that the monetary relief authorized by the special settlement
statute could properly have been obtained within the parameters of the APA.
Thus, the Cobell lawsuit itself came to an end with a congressionally enacted
jurisdictional reprieve, but one limited to that litigation. It was a legislative ticket
good for the Cobell ride only. Unfortunately, in the decade since the original Cobell
jurisdictional rulings, a growing number of other plaintiffs have tried to get on the
District Court train for Indian breach of trust claims.191 Through “an unprecedented
projection of District Court authority into the province of the Court of Federal
Claims over money-based claims by Indians against the United States,”192 the
Cobell decision set the stage for forum shopping, clever pleading of money claims
as requests for equitable relief, jurisdictional confusion, and duplicative litigation.
These parallel lawsuits led to a collision between the Court of Federal Claims and
the District Court that eventually landed in the Supreme Court.193
B. The Adequacy of Remedies in the Court of Federal Claims and the District
Court in Indian Breach of Trust Cases
1. Tucker Act and Indian Tucker Act Suits in the Court of Federal Claims for
Breach of Trust
While individual Native American and tribal claimants may pursue
constitutional and statutory claims for money under the Tucker Act in the same
manner as others, the historical guardian-ward relationship between the federal
government and indigenous peoples may give rise to a “breach of trust” cause of
action.194 When a genuine fiduciary relationship between the United States and an
Indian tribe or individual American Indian is confirmed with respect to a particular
category of Indian assets or resources, the Tucker Act195 or Indian Tucker Act196
authorize an action for money damages in the Court of Federal Claims.
In United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe,197 the Supreme Court
explained that, although an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity is a
predicate to any suit against the United States, the Tucker Act and the companion
Indian Tucker Act operate to provide such consent.198 Because the Tucker Act does
not create a cause of action, the plaintiff must premise the substantive right on a
statute or regulation that “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by
the Federal Government for the damage sustained.”199 The pertinent statute or
01285-JR (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2010).
191. See infra Part III.A.
192. Sisk, supra note 60, at 665; see also Reilly v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 643, 651
(2010) (describing Cobell as one of those “isolated cases” that mistakenly suggest money
claims may be framed under the APA as seeking equitable relief).
193. See infra Part III.A.
194. On the trust responsibility of the federal government to Indian tribes and individuals
and the enforcement of that trust, see generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW, supra note 54, at §§ 5.04[4], 5.05.
195. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006).
196. Id. § 1505.
197. 537 U.S. 465 (2003).
198. Id. at 472.
199. Id. (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983)).
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regulation need only “be reasonably amenable to the reading that it mandates a
right of recovery in damages”; that is, “a fair inference will do.”200
Neither the general trust relationship that historically existed between the United
States and the Indian peoples nor the common law of trust alone can give rise to the
type of fiduciary relationship that is enforceable by judicial action through the
Tucker Act or Indian Tucker Act. A statutory- or regulatory-created fiduciary
relationship remains indispensable to inferring a right to sue for breach of trust.201
In looking for a substantive right in an Indian breach of trust case under the Tucker
Act, the Supreme Court in United States v. Navajo Nation202 said that “the analysis
must train on specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory
prescriptions.”203
However, in some contrast with ordinary Tucker Act claims,204 once a statutoryor regulatory-based fiduciary relationship is identified between the United States
and Native Americans, the statutory or regulatory “prescriptions need not . . .
expressly provide for money damages; the availability of such damages may be
inferred.”205 Once the statutory “focus” of a specific fiduciary duty has been
provided, then, as the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. White Mountain
Apache Tribe,206 the “general trust law [is to be] considered in drawing the
inference that Congress intended damages to remedy a breach of obligation.”207 To
demand an express statutory reference to money damages as the available remedy,
the Court concluded, “would read the trust relation out of Indian Tucker Act
analysis.”208
Because, as I have described it previously, “a Native American claim for breach
of trust against the federal government must be constructed upon a statutory
foundation,”209 successful claims typically arise from statutes that describe
pervasive government control over, and establish management rules for, particular
assets or resources that are being held in trust for individual Indians or tribes. Thus,
in White Mountain Apache, the governing statute not only stated that the Fort
Apache site would be held in trust for the tribe but granted discretion to the
government to use the property, which the government had exercised by assuming
“plenary” control through daily occupation.210 In United States v. Mitchell,211 the

200. Id. at 473.
201. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224 (1983) (holding that congressional
enactments or administrative regulations must be adduced to “establish a fiduciary
relationship and define the contours of the United States’ fiduciary responsibilities”).
202. 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
203. Id. at 506.
204. See Sisk, supra note 54, at 340 (explaining that, in regular Tucker Act cases outside
the fiduciary context of Indian breach of trust claims, “while the statute need not authorize
judicial action or even contemplate the prospect of litigation—the Tucker Act expressly
creates the right to file suit—the statute must speak in the dialect of lucre”).
205. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 506.
206. 537 U.S. 465 (2003).
207. Id. at 477.
208. Id.
209. Sisk, supra note 54, at 344.
210. White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. at 475.
211. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
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pertinent statute was held to impose fiduciary duties on the United States with
respect to timber harvesting on Indian lands because the government, by statute,
had “assume[d] such elaborate control over forests and property belonging to
Indians.”212
When, however, the governing statute instead evidences a purpose to “yield[]
management, supervision, and possession of Native American resources, and
thereby restor[e] autonomous and independent control to the tribe or individual
property owners,” then, as I have explained, “the governmental fiduciary role fades
accordingly.”213 In Navajo Nation, for example, the Court found that the Indian
Mineral Leasing Act214 was designed “to enhance tribal self-determination,” giving
the primary power to negotiate and transact coal mining leases to the tribes.215
Thus, a particular statutory policy of encouraging Indian self-determination,
together with withdrawal of government possession and management, tends to
contradict an inference of a fiduciary responsibility on the part of the United States,
enforceable by a damages remedy.216
In addition to statutes and regulations creating trust duties for the United States
with respect to management of natural resources, a fiduciary duty creating an
inference of a Tucker Act or Indian Tucker Act remedy may arise from statutes
prescribing governmental duties in receiving, holding, investing, and distributing
funds for individual Indians or tribes. Statutes such as the American Indian Trust
Fund Management Reform Act of 1994,217 which imposes certain duties on the
United States in managing, investing, and accounting for funds “held in trust by the
United States for the benefit of an Indian tribe or an individual Indian,”218 and the
Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982,219 which applies to
royalties on oil or gas leases on Indian lands, do not create an express right of
action in court for breach of these duties or provide that violation of the statutory
terms should be compensated by damages. Again, however, that is where the
Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act come into play, by allowing inference of a
cause of action for breach of trust that may be remedied by a money judgment in
the Court of Federal Claims.
Given the express statutory provision that the funds are held in trust, the
pervasive control of the government over the funds, and the specific statutory
directions as to how funds are to be managed, invested, and accounted for, a

212. Id. at 225.
213. Sisk, supra note 54, at 348.
214. 25 U.S.C. § 396a.
215. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 508 (2003); see also United States v.
Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 288 (2009) (holding that “the Tribe cannot identify a specific,
applicable, trust-creating statute or regulation that the Government violated”).
216. See Sisk, supra note 54, at 348–52 (emphasizing that each distinctive set of statutory
and regulatory rules must be evaluated to determine “whether the governmental role in a
particular case is best described as one of engaged management of mineral resources or one
of detached supervision of largely independent Indian management of their own resources,”
so that the government is held to “conscientious execution of those obligations that endure in
the statutory text”).
217. 25 U.S.C. §§ 161–162a, 4001–4061 (2006).
218. Id. § 4011(a).
219. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1715(a), 1732(b)(2) (2006).
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fiduciary relationship plainly exists with respect to these tribal and individual
Indian trust accounts.220 Given further that mishandling of funds almost invariably
will result in loss of funds from the accounts of those to whom they belong and
additional loss of the investment value of those funds, a breach of these fiduciary
duties by the United States would state a claim under the Tucker Act and the Indian
Tucker Act.221 Because it is doubtful that an allegation of breach of trust of these
statutory fiduciary duties with respect to money accounts could arise without the
fact of retrospective financial harm, a money judgment remedy is not only
available, but provides an adequate remedy within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
CFC.222
2. The Adequacy of a Money Judgment (and Collateral Relief) in the Court of
Federal Claims in Indian Breach of Trust Cases
The Supreme Court long has recognized the adequacy of a money judgment to
remedy a meritorious claim of breach of trust by the government in its fiduciary
responsibilities in managing Native American assets and resources. In United
States v. Mitchell,223 an Indian breach of trust case involving government
management of Indian timber resources, the Court described the Tucker Act
remedy in the Court of Federal Claims as, not merely adequate, but superior to the
alternative of a suit for specific relief in the District Court under the APA. As the
Court observed, a Tucker Act suit for retrospective damages caused by the
government’s breach of its fiduciary duty to manage resources held in trust is
essential because prospective remedies available under the APA would be “totally
inadequate” in deterring government mismanagement and ensuring that Native
Americans receive the proper value of the managed resources.224
In clarifying the state of the law pursuant to its national appellate jurisdiction
over Tucker Act matters,225 the Federal Circuit has specifically noted its
disagreement with the federal courts in the District of Columbia on the proper
jurisdictional venue for Indian breach of trust claims involving mishandling of
funds in individual and tribal accounts. In Eastern Shawnee Tribe v. United

220. For decisions inferring a fiduciary duty from statutes governing tribal trust accounts,
which is enforceable by an action for damages under the Tucker Act and Indian Tucker Act,
see Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 726, 731–38 (2011) (finding that
statutory provisions on investment of tribal funds imposed a fiduciary duty of prudent
investment on the United States); Osage Tribe of Indians of Okla. v. United States, 72 Fed.
Cl. 629, 668 (2006) (same); Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Indians of Okla. v. United States,
512 F.2d 1390, 1392–94 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (same).
221. See supra note 220.
222. See Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REV. 1577,
1605 (2002) (“If the defendant either has spent the plaintiff’s money or still has the money,
then the remedy at law is adequate—the plaintiff sues for a money judgment.”). See infra
Part II.B.2.
223. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
224. Id. at 226–28.
225. See supra Part I.C.
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States,226 the Federal Circuit referred to the D.C. Circuit’s Cobell decision227 and
then said:
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit—we think incorrectly—has nonetheless held that §§ 702 and
704 of the APA do not bar a suit in the district court for an equitable
accounting and the award of monetary relief, though it has agreed that
some forms of monetary relief are unavailable in the district court and
must be sought in the Court of Federal Claims.228
a. Money Judgment for Indian Breach of Trust Claims
When an individual Native American or tribe has suffered past monetary loss as
a result of a governmental breach of trust, a claim for a retrospective money
judgment will remedy that harm. To be sure, the trust doctrine applies to disputes
about governmental trust responsibilities beyond management of Native American
resources and funds. Breach of trust may be alleged as a non-monetary claim for
specific relief when the harm caused by the government’s misconduct or dereliction
of duty does not translate directly into economic terms and monetary relief is not
sought.229 Moreover, when the harm has not yet been realized and the claim is
wholly forward-looking in effect, a claim for a money judgment would be
premature.
In theory, perhaps, if supported by statutory authority and pursued under the
APA, a request for an equitable accounting of Indian accounts or assets managed in
trust by the federal government might be presented divorced from any pecuniary
element if no economic harm has yet occurred or is entirely speculative. As a
practical matter, however, an Indian trust dispute involving government
management of tribal assets or funds will rarely, if ever, arise separately from
existing financial injury.
In both the Cobell230 and post-Cobell litigation in the District Court, Native
American plaintiffs alleged a breach of trust with already-suffered financial
consequences. Consider, for example, the Tohono O’odham Nation’s lawsuit in
District Court regarding the United States’ management of tribal trust fund
accounts, which later became the subject of a jurisdictional collision because of
duplicative litigation in the CFC.231 In that case, the Nation began its complaint by
alleging “breaches of trust by the United States . . . in the management and
accounting of trust assets, including funds and lands.”232 In the first paragraph of its
District Court complaint, the Nation sought not only an accounting but also the

226. 582 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
227. See supra Part II.A.
228. Eastern Shawnee, 582 F.3d at 1308–09.
229. On claims for equitable and injunctive relief to enforce the federal government’s
trust duties, see generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 54, at §
5.05[1][a].
230. See supra Part II.A.
231. See infra Part III.A.
232. Complaint at 1, Tohono O’odham Nation v. Kempthorne, No. 06-cv-02236-TFH
(D.D.C. Dec. 28, 2006).

2013]

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS

111

“correct[ion of] the balances of the Nation’s trust fund accounts to reflect accurate
balances.”233 Indeed, the Nation asked the District Court for remedies of
“disgorgement” and “equitable restitution,”234 that is, a transfer of money from the
federal government to the Nation.
When the Tohono O’odham Nation’s filing of simultaneous lawsuits in both the
District Court and the CFC later was questioned before the Supreme Court,235 the
Nation attempted to distinguish the monetary relief sought in the two lawsuits. The
Nation contended that the complaint in District Court sought “the return of ‘old
money’ that belongs to the Nation but erroneously does not appear on its balance
sheet”;236 that is, an infusion of cash if an equitable accounting showed that funds
were missing from accounts. By contrast, the Nation insisted, its complaint in the
CFC sought “damages in the form of ‘new money’ that the Nation should have
earned as profit but did not”;237 that is, the financial consequences of lost
investment opportunities.
In considering the adequacy of a money judgment under the Tucker Act or the
Indian Tucker Act, however, purported distinctions between “particular pots of
money as different relief”238 are distinctions without a difference.239 As the
Supreme Court clarified in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v.
Knudson,240 when a plaintiff seeks a supposed “restitution” remedy “‘to obtain a
judgment imposing a merely personal liability upon the defendant to pay a sum of
money,’” the claim is a legal one not substantively different from a claim for
ordinary damages.241 For that reason, as Professor Nora Pasman-Green and attorney
Alexis Derrossett explain, “most restitution claims result in a money judgment,
which is satisfied by the same enforcement procedures as a damage award.”242
In any event, the CFC’s authority under the Tucker Act does not turn on such
dichotomies as old versus new money, equitable versus legal remedies, money
“damages” versus other monetary relief, or specific versus substitutionary relief.243

233. Id. at 2.
234. Id. at 18. On the availability of claims for “restitution” or “disgorgement,” see infra
Part II.B.3.d.
235. See infra Part III.A.
236. Brief for Respondent, supra note 18, at 25 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
237. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
238. Tohono O’odham Nation v. United States, 559 F.3d 1284, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(Moore, J., dissenting) (disputing that the District Court and CFC complaints actually sought
different relief), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011).
239. See Craig A. Schwartz, Footloose: How to Tame the Tucker Act Shuffle After United
States v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 2, 20 (2011) (describing
the “old money” versus “new money” distinction in Tohono O’odham Nation as
“hairsplitting”).
240. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
241. Id. at 213 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 cmt. a at 641–42 (1936)).
242. Nora J. Pasman-Green & Alexis Derrossett, Twenty Years After Bowen v.
Massachusetts—Damages or Restitution: When Does It Still Matter? When Should It?, 69
LA. L. REV. 749, 761 (2009).
243. Cf. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1733 n.2 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
the judgment) (noting, for purposes of the jurisdictional bar on duplicative litigation against
the United States in 28 U.S.C. § 1500, that “[t]he formal label affixed to the form of relief
sought is irrelevant” where both the “equitable relief” claim and the damages claim “seek
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Plainly and simply, the CFC may award money, without respect to label.244 If a
substantive right to action authorizes payment, the CFC has the power under the
Tucker Act and Indian Tucker Act to enter a money judgment. As the CFC held
with respect to the parallel Tohono O’odham Nation litigation in that forum, “in
this court, no distinction is to be found between money ‘old’ and ‘new.’ Rather, if
successful, a plaintiff is made whole, to the extent possible, by the payment of
money for the government's breaches of trust.”245
When a retrospective monetary remedy is available, it is “adequate” absent
extraordinary circumstances, notwithstanding the unavailability of prospective or
equitable remedies. “[A]sking for ‘more’ relief where monetary relief will satisfy
the claimant’s needs cannot defeat the jurisdictional scheme set up by Congress—
to centralize money claims against the government, except those claims under
$10,000 and those sounding in tort, in the [Court of Federal Claims].”246
And, as noted, Native American plaintiffs bringing suit for breach of trust
invariably do so because they already have suffered financial harm—the fact of real
and present injury is what prompts the tribe or individual to resort to litigation.
b. Collateral Relief (Including Accounting Equivalent)
Under the Remand Act of 1972, “[t]o provide an entire remedy and to complete
the relief afforded by the judgment,” the CFC has authority “as an incident of and
collateral to any such judgment” to “issue orders directing . . . correction of
applicable records . . . to any appropriate official of the United States.”247
Moreover, “[i]n any case within its jurisdiction, the court shall have the power to
remand appropriate matters to any administrative or executive body or official with
such direction as it may deem proper and just.”248 When this amendment to the
Tucker Act was enacted, the House report explained: “[W]hen the Court of Claims
does have jurisdiction over any case before it, this bill will enable the court to grant
all necessary relief in one action.”249
Through this statutory grant of limited equitable-type powers, the CFC may both
award a money judgment for mismanagement of Native American resources and,
incident and collateral to that money judgment, order correction of the financial
records and trust accounts maintained by the government, either directly or by
money to remedy the Government’s alleged failure to keep accurate accounts”).
244. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 900–01 n.31 (1988) (explaining that,
while the scope of the APA is limited by the exclusion of “money damages,” “[t]he
jurisdiction of the Claims Court . . . is not expressly limited to actions for ‘money
damages’”); Tohono O’Odham Nation v. United States, 559 F.3d 1284, 1295 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“While it may be true that money damages is a different
technical legal theory than equitable restitution or disgorgement, nonetheless the claim for
money damages [in the CFC] can access the same pot of ‘old money’ that the equitable
claims in the district court can access.”); Kanemoto v. Reno, 41 F.3d 641, 646 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court recognized that the Tucker Act is not limited to suits for
money damages.”).
245. Tohono O’odham Nation v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 645, 658 n.14 (2008), rev’d,
559 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011).
246. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Hodel, 815 F.2d 352, 367 (5th Cir. 1987).
247. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) (2006).
248. Id.
249. H.R. REP. NO. 92-1023, at 3 (1972).
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remanding the matter to the appropriate agency to reconcile trust accounts. As the
Federal Circuit has observed in dicta, the CFC “appears to have the authority to
order an equitable accounting as ancillary relief.”250
In United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation,251 a majority of the Supreme Court
turned aside the Nation’s claimed hardship of being precluded from filing
simultaneous claims in District Court (for an accounting) and in the Court of
Federal Claims (for a money judgment) by observing that the Nation “could have
filed in the CFC alone and if successful obtained monetary relief to compensate for
any losses caused by the Government’s breach of duty.”252 The concurring Justices
in Tohono O’odham Nation responded that “the CFC has held that it lacks
jurisdiction to issue a preliability accounting.”253 The concurrence’s response is
correct as far as it goes—the CFC’s authority to grant collateral equitable-type
relief is triggered only by an underlying claim of past-due monetary liability under
the Tucker Act or Indian Tucker Act. However, the allegation of a breach of trust
arising from an enforceable fiduciary relationship typically transfigures a claim
from a preliability to a postliability one, that is, from a purely prospective to a
retrospective allegation.
As explained above, as a practical matter, Indian breach of trust suits involving
government mismanagement of Native American assets invariably are or could be
premised on past harm giving rise to monetary liability, rather than posing abstract
future-looking claims divorced from existing financial injury. Notably, the Tohono
O’odham Nation concurrence followed its statement with a “but see” citation to the
Federal Circuit’s suggestion that an equitable accounting may be ordered as
collateral relief under the Remand Act.254
Even prior to the 1972 congressional grant of additional remedial authority
ancillary to a money judgment, the CFC always had “the power to require an
accounting in aid of its jurisdiction to render a money judgment on that claim.”255
Likewise, discovery in the CFC has always been available to secure government
documents and records relevant to the claim.256
Although supplemental to a monetary remedy, the CFC’s power to demand a
complete, detailed, and accurate accounting (or its equivalent) of Indian assets that
are the subject of a breach of trust claim should not be doubted. (In any event, the
APA does not remain available in the District Court whenever the alternative

250. E. Shawnee Tribe v. United States, 582 F.3d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also
Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 225, 234 (2008) (“[W]hen [a] plaintiff [in
the CFC] requests monetary damages for breach of trust, plaintiff is, in substance, also
asking for an accounting in support of that award.”).
251. 131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011).
252. Id. at 1730–31. On the Tohono O’odham Nation decision and its implications for
forum selection, see infra Part III.A & III.B.2.
253. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1735 n.5 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
254. Id.; see also infra Part III.B.2.a.
255. Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. United States, 174 Ct. Cl. 483, 490 (1966).
256. See 28 U.S.C. § 2507(a) (2006) (authorizing CFC to “call upon any department or
agency of the United States . . . for any information or papers, not privileged, for purposes of
discovery or for use as evidence”); 28 U.S.C. § 2521(a) (authorizing CFC to issue
“subpoenas requiring the production of books, papers, documents or tangible things” and
granting CFC the power to punish “contempt of its authority”).
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remedy afforded by Congress in another court is imperfect, awkward, or less than
comprehensive; rather, § 704 withdraws the power of judicial review under the
APA when the alternative remedy in another court for a general class of claimants
is “adequate.”257) In sum, when an individual American Indian or tribe presents a
meritorious claim of breach of trust by the United States, that claim can be
adequately remedied by a money judgment and collateral relief available in the
CFC under the Tucker Act and Indian Tucker Act.
3. The Availability and Scope of a Claim for an Accounting and Equitable
Remedies in Indian Breach of Trust Cases in the District Court
Even aside from the exclusion of claims for money damages under § 702 and
the withdrawal of judicial review when an adequate remedy lies in another court
under § 704, the APA is an uncertain, and at best limited, source of authority for
relief in Indian breach of trust cases involving mismanagement of assets, such as
tribal funds. In particular, a private right of action (if any exists) requiring the
United States to prepare an accounting of Indian trust assets is now likely limited to
obtaining information as specifically prescribed by statute (along with perhaps a
basic reconciliation of account statements). Additional remedies such as restitution
for monies missing from trust accounts are almost certainly outside the parameters
of the APA.
In the Cobell litigation,258 which opened the door to Indian breach of trust
claims in District Court, the plaintiffs initially framed their claim for an accounting
of Indian trust accounts as falling under the APA, both as a waiver of sovereign
immunity and as the cause of action for review of agency action under the
American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994.259 Nonetheless,
although the link never was fully severed, the tether to the APA’s review
provisions and thus to a statutory-based cause of action was always loose and
became more so during the course of the litigation. For example, in an early
appellate decision in Cobell in 2001, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that “the 1994
Act is not the source of plaintiffs’ rights,”260 saying instead that “an action for
accounting is an equitable claim and that courts of equity have original jurisdiction
to compel an accounting.”261 (Subsequently, the D.C. Circuit retreated somewhat,
cautioning in a later Cobell appeal that the court should not too readily “abstract[]
the common law duties from any statutory basis.”262)

257. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006); see also Reilly v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 643, 652
(2010) (“Generally speaking, this requirement [for APA authority under § 704] focuses not
on the availability of a remedy to a particular plaintiff in a given case, but rather on the
adequacy of a remedy to a category of claimants.”).
258. See supra Part II.A.
259. 25 U.S.C. §§ 161–162a, 4001–4061 (2006). The D.C. Circuit held that the agency’s
performance of trust fund accounting duties had been “unreasonably delayed” under the
APA right of action for judicial review as stated in 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Cobell v. Norton, 240
F.3d 1081, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
260. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1096.
261. Id. at 1104 (quoting Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. United States, 174 Ct. Cl. 483,
487) (1966)).
262. Cobell v. Norton, 392 F.3d 461, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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In post-Cobell Indian breach of trust litigation in the District Court, most tribal
plaintiffs wholly abandoned the APA as a source of a substantive right of action,
while still asking the courts to recognize the APA as providing the necessary
statutory consent to litigate against the federal government. In the breach of trust
cases by the Tohono O’odham Nation and other tribes in consolidated litigation
before the District Court for the District of Columbia, the tribes argued that they
possessed an independent cause of action in equity for an accounting that can be
enforced outside of the APA.263 The tribes insisted they had stated a “non-APA
claim for an accounting,”264 denying that their accounting right was based on the
1994 statute and the judicial review provisions of the APA. They said that they
have presented “a pure trust claim,” which “in no way implicates the substantive or
procedural standards of the APA.”265
Rather, in this post-Cobell litigation, the tribes described their District Court
complaints as stating “an independent, equitable cause of action by a trust
beneficiary to enforce express and implied federal statutory trust
responsibilities.”266 In so doing, they “invoke[d the District] Court’s inherent
equitable authority to enforce the terms of that statutorily-created trust.”267 And the
tribes further sought from the District Court what they characterized as
restitutionary remedies for any misplaced or lost tribal funds.268

a. The Requirement of a Waiver of Sovereign Immunity and a Substantive Cause
of Action
For any plaintiff to bring a civil lawsuit against the United States in any federal
court, the plaintiff must adduce three things: (1) subject matter jurisdiction, (2) a
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, and (3) a substantive cause of action.

263. Plaintiffs’ Principal Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 20,
Tohono O’odham Nation v. Kempthorne, Civil Action No. 06-2236-JR (D.D.C. July 16,
2008). In similar breach of trust cases in the District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma, tribes also have asserted claims under federal common law, beyond the APA and
other federal statutes. Tonkawa Tribe v. Kempthorne, No. CIV-06-1435-F, 2009 WL
742896, at *3 n.3, *4 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 17, 2009); Otoe-Missouria Tribe v. Kempthorne,
No. CIV-06-1436-C, 2008 WL 5205191, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 10, 2008).
264. Plaintiffs’ Principal Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 263, at 15.
265. Plaintiffs’ Joint Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Remand and
Stay of Litigation at 52, Tohono O’odham Nation v. Kempthorne, Civil Action No. 06-2236JR (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2007). Despite the vehemence of the tribal plaintiffs’ rejection of the
APA as the source of their right of action, the tribes apparently wished to hold on to APA
review as a fallback, saying, for example, “that the government has not even come close to
complying with the 1994 Act’s requirements.” Plaintiffs’ Principal Brief in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 263, at 40.
266. Plaintiffs’ Principal Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 263, at 24.
267. Id.
268. Complaint at 1, Tohono O’odham Nation v. Kempthorne, Civil Action No. 06-2236JR (D.D.C. Dec. 28, 2006).
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Unless superseded by another statute that directs exclusive jurisdiction in
another forum, the general federal-question jurisdictional statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1331,
confers authority on the District Court to review federal agency action.269 In 1976,
Congress amended the APA to expressly waive the sovereign immunity of the
government, thereby allowing suits seeking judicial review of an agency’s action to
be brought directly against the government itself in federal District Court.270
Section 702 of the APA thus provides:
An action in a court of the United States . . . stating a claim that an
agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an
official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed
nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United
States or that the United States is an indispensable party. The United
States may be named as a defendant in any such action, and a judgment
or decree may be entered against the United States.271
Beyond waiving sovereign immunity, the APA itself creates a substantive right of
action by outlining the right to review of final agency action under § 704 and the
remedies available for judicial review of agency action in § 706.272
Although post-Cobell tribal plaintiffs in District Court cited to the general
federal-question jurisdictional statute and to the APA’s waiver of sovereign
immunity, they declined the APA’s express right of action for judicial review of
agency action. Instead, the tribes wished to avoid the limitations of administrative
law and secure a broader judicial investigation and evaluation of the government’s
handling of tribal trust accounts.273 To succeed with that approach, however, the
tribal plaintiffs had to find another private right of action in another statutory
source. Failing to identify a statutory right of action, the tribes instead asserted an
independent cause of action that arises in equity and requires the government to
provide a broad-based accounting for all Indian assets held in trust.
b. The Non-Viability of an Independent Cause of Action for an Accounting in
Equity
While the tribes’ assertion of an independent equitable cause of action was
always doubtful,274 it plainly has been swept aside by Supreme Court rulings in

269. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
270. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721.
271. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
272. Id. §§ 704, 706.
273. See Plaintiffs’ Joint Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Remand
and Stay of Litigation, supra note 265, at 58 (saying that the tribes’ “primary cause of action
is a trust claim and not an administrative law claim”).
274. See Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999) (stating that the
APA should not be misunderstood “as waiving immunity from all actions that are equitable
in nature”); Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 61–62 (2004) (stating the
APA’s limitations on review apply unless another “statute provides a private right of action”
(emphasis added)); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (“Raising up causes of
action where a statute has not created them may be a proper function for common-law
courts, but not for federal tribunals.” (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
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Indian breach of trust cases over the past few years. In those cases, decided in 2009
and 2011, the Supreme Court clarified and emphasized that duties based directly on
the general law of trusts cannot give rise to legally cognizable rights by tribes to
sue the United States government for breach of trust.
In United States v. Navajo Nation,275 decided in 2009, the Court stated that a
tribe alleging breach of trust must identify a statute that creates a specific fiduciary
duty and allege that the government violated that statutorily defined duty.276 While
“principles of trust law might be relevant” to the next question of whether a remedy
of damages is available for breach of trust, they play no role in the “threshold”
question of whether an enforceable duty exists.277
In United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation,278 decided in 2011, the Court further
emphasized the requirement of a statutory foundation for fiduciary duties and
rejected the existence of a governmental duty to disclose information about tribal
trust accounts beyond that specified in a statute. During Indian trust litigation
brought in the Court of Federal Claims (CFC), the government objected to
discovery requests by the Jicarilla Apache Nation as seeking documents protected
by the government’s attorney-client privilege.279 The CFC and the Federal Circuit
applied a common-law exception to the privilege based on the duty of a trustee to
share all information with the beneficiary and not withhold attorney-client
communications.280 In rejecting the application of a common-law fiduciary
exception to the attorney-client privilege in Indian breach of trust suits against the
United States, the Court made two statements directly pertinent to the question of
whether an independent cause of action for an accounting is available to the tribes
based on the inherent equitable powers of the federal courts.
First, in a majority opinion by Justice Alito, the Jicarilla Apache Court held:
Although the Government’s responsibilities with respect to the
management of funds belonging to Indian tribes bear some resemblance
to those of a private trustee, this analogy cannot be taken too far. The
trust obligations of the United States to the Indian tribes are established
and governed by statute rather than the common law, and in fulfilling
its statutory duties, the Government acts not as a private trustee but
pursuant to its sovereign interest in the execution of federal law.281
While general trust principles may play a role “to inform [the Court’s]
interpretation of statutes and to determine the scope of liability” for breach of trust,
the trust duties imposed on the government are defined by statute.282 In other
words, common-law trust principles still have a robust role to play in constructing
the meaning and specific application of a fiduciary duty that has been established
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 365 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment)).
275. 556 U.S. 287 (2009).
276. Id. at 290.
277. Id. at 291.
278. 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011).
279. Id. at 2319–20.
280. Id. at 2318–20.
281. Id. at 2318.
282. Id. at 2325.
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by a statute or regulation, but the existence of the fiduciary duty must arise directly
from the statute or regulation and not be inferred from the common law.283 In
essence, then, the Jicarilla Apache Court ruled,“[t]he Government assumes Indian
trust responsibilities only to the extent it expressly accepts those responsibilities by
statute.”284
The Supreme Court thereby disavowed any non-statutory source for a
substantive right by an American Indian tribe or member against the United States
under the trust doctrine. Whether described as a common-law theory or an inherent
equitable right grounded in general trust law, the post-Cobell tribes’ assertion of an
independent, non-statutory right to a wide-sweeping equitable accounting of tribal
assets in District Court no longer can be sustained. Because trust responsibilities
must be grounded directly on the terms of a statute, an independent cause of action
for an accounting does not survive after Jicarilla Apache.
Second, the Court in Jicarilla Apache held that the United States “does not have
the same common-law disclosure obligations as a private trustee.”285 Rather,
Congress has specified “narrowly defined disclosure obligations” in the trust
accounting and management statutes, which may not be read “to incorporate the
full duties of a private, common-law fiduciary.”286
Accordingly, the government’s duties to disclose information—which lie at the
heart of any request for an accounting—are limited to those stated in the 1994 Act
and other statutes. In contrast with the rulings in Cobell and post-Cobell litigation,
which are now superseded by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Navajo Nation and
Jicarilla Apache, the parameters of the government’s duties to provide an
accounting and reconciliation are those detailed in the statutes and may not be
augmented by judicially-fashioned equitable or common-law notions.
When Congress has intended to make the United States liable in court pursuant
to common-law causes of action, it has done so expressly. Under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 287 which waives sovereign immunity for tort-based claims against the
United States, the substantive cause of action is to be found in the law of “the place
where the act or omission” giving rise to the claim occurred.288 In this way, as the
Supreme Court later explained, Congress determined “to build upon the legal

283. Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 726, 738 (2011) (noting that
Supreme Court decisions “have relied upon the common law to map the scope of enforceable
fiduciary duties established by statutes and regulations”).
284. Jicarilla Apache, 131 S. Ct. at 2325.
285. Id. at 2329.
286. Id. at 2330. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred that “the
Government is not an ordinary trustee” and thus retained the attorney-client privilege over
the sought documents, but saw it as “unnecessary to decide what information other than
attorney-client communications the Government may withhold from the beneficiaries of
tribal trusts.” Id. at 2331 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original).
Justice Sotomayor dissented, taking special issue with what she viewed as “the majority’s
disregard of [the Court’s] settled precedent that looks to common-law trust principles to
define the scope of the Government’s fiduciary obligations to Indian tribes.” Id. at 2331–32
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
287. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 843 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2671–2680).
288. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674 (2006).
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relationships formulated and characterized by the States” rather than create new
federal tort causes of action.289 By contrast, Congress chose to provide a remedy to
tribes for breach of trust through the Indian Tucker Act, which turns the focus on
federal statutes and regulations as a source of rights.290
c. Contrasting the Scope of an APA Claim for Accounting with the Indian Tucker
Act Claim for Breach of Trust
Setting aside for the moment the premise of this Article that the availability of a
money judgment in the Court of Federal Claims (CFC) in an Indian breach of trust
case precludes a claim for an accounting in District Court, the first obstacle
presented to post-Cobell lawsuits by Jicarilla Apache could be (partially)
overcome. Tribal plaintiffs seeking to hold on to District Court review could
premise their claims fully and completely on the APA, both as a waiver of
sovereign immunity and as a right of action. By restoring the APA to the center of
the lawsuit, those Indian breach of trust claims would be cognizable—if at all—
only as administrative law claims. In general, these tribal accounting claims would
be subject to the same standards and limitations on APA review that apply to other
cases involving court review of final agency action.
The second obstacle posed by Jicarilla Apache to a separate claim for
accounting brought in District Court goes directly to the scope of the claim and the
remedy. With particular relevance to accounting claims, the Supreme Court in
Jicarilla Apache pointedly stated that a tribe’s right to information about the
government’s management of trust funds is limited to those disclosure duties set
forth in the trust fund accounting statutes.291 Tribal plaintiffs prosecuting
accounting claims in District Court henceforth will be restricted to identifying
specific ways in which the government has failed to provide particular information
that the statutes expressly required the government to disclose. Otherwise, under
Jicarilla Apache, the government has no general duty to disclose records and thus,
as a matter of substantive law, is not legally obliged to provide a broader
accounting and reconciliation.
For example, the 1994 statute requires the government to provide quarterly
statements of trust account performance and an annual audit letter with respect to
tribal trust accounts,292 as well as a report to Congress that reconciles the balances
for each trust account.293 Requests for additional records, for records about assets
other than tribal trust accounts or royalties that are governed by statutory disclosure
rules, and for information in a different form or on a different timetable than the
periodic statements, letters, and reports specified in the statutes presumably will
now be unavailing—at least in a direct claim for an accounting as such.

289. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
290. See supra Part II.B.1–2.
291. See supra notes 285–286 and accompanying text.
292. 25 U.S.C. §§ 162a(d), 4011 (2006). In addition, Interior Department regulations
direct certain information to be provided at the request of a tribe. 25 C.F.R. § 115.802
(2001).
293. 25 U.S.C. § 4044 (2006).
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Importantly, tribal plaintiffs who sue—not for a mere accounting—but for a
money judgment for breach of trust under the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker
Act in the CFC may be entitled to a broader remedy and to greater access to
evidence.294 If the tribes establish the necessary fiduciary relationship, prove a
breach of the government’s duties, and demonstrate they have suffered economic
injury, then they may obtain a money judgment as well as correction of financial
records.295
To be sure, even during discovery in a CFC case, which after all is where the
Jicarilla Apache case arose, the government’s duty to share particular documents
and records about trust funds would be limited to what the governing information
disclosure statutes provide, per Jicarilla Apache. However, when the issue is not
merely the sharing of information but proving financial injury through
mismanagement of trust accounts or other tribal resources by the government under
an established fiduciary relationship, the tribes presumably remain entitled to
directed discovery of certain kinds of additional evidence about the nature of the
assets held in trust, the government’s exercise of its duties, and the extent of
harm—excluding, of course, any materials over which the government properly
asserts the attorney-client privilege.
Moreover, as an essential aid to the CFC in granting a money judgment, the
court presumably retains the power to secure the evidence needed to determine the
proper size of that judgment. By express statutory provision, the CFC has authority
to “call upon any department or agency of the United States . . . for any information
or papers, not privileged, for purposes of discovery or for use as evidence”296 and to
issue “subpoenas requiring the production of books, papers, documents or tangible
things.”297
Consider, for example, the situation in United States v. White Mountain Apache
Tribe,298 which the Supreme Court decided in favor of the Tribe in 2003. There,
Congress had declared that Fort Apache and other improvements on the site, such
as a school, would be held in trust for the benefit of the White Mountain Apache
tribe of east-central Arizona.299 The government occupied and used the property, as
allowed under the trust statute, but then allowed the property to fall into
disrepair.300 The Tribe sued in the CFC for breach of trust, seeking compensation
for the projected costs of repairs and additional damages for economic loss.301
The pertinent Indian trust account statutes do not provide for an accounting of
non-monetary trust assets, nor did the particular statute creating the Fort Apache
trust create any specific duties about disclosure of information.302 Accordingly,
after Jicarilla Apache, a suit by the White Mountain Apache Tribe for an

294. See supra Part II.B.2.
295. See supra Part II.B.2.
296. 28 U.S.C. § 2507(a) (2006).
297. Id. § 2521(a).
298. 537 U.S. 465 (2003).
299. Id. at 468–69.
300. Id. at 469.
301. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 20, 22–23 (1999), rev’d,
249 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
302. Act of Mar. 18, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-392, 74 Stat. 8 (1960).
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accounting under the APA in District Court would have been without purpose, for
no independent duty of accounting or disclosure of particular information pursuant
to statute existed.
But as part of the Indian breach of trust claim under the Tucker Act and the
Indian Tucker Act, the White Mountain Apache Tribe surely was entitled to obtain
evidence through discovery about how the property had been used, to establish the
type and extent of damage to the improvements, to determine the economic benefit
the government had obtained from its use, and so forth. And the CFC trial judge
certainly needed access to government-controlled evidence so that the money
judgment entered for the government’s waste of the real property held in trust was
not speculative.
Accordingly, while the Jicarilla Apache decision restricts access to particular
trust account records to those which must be disclosed by statute, the decision
should not be understood as a general immunity of the federal government from
appropriate discovery in a liability proceeding, subject of course to protection for
privilege. Evidence other than trust account records, such as answers to
interrogatory questions, depositions of responsible government officials, and other
documentary evidence of breach of trust or resulting harm, surely remains
discoverable in breach of trust litigation.
In White Mountain Apache, the Supreme Court held that the tribe was entitled to
damages for the government’s waste of the property.303 That declared right to a
remedy would be meaningless without supporting evidence, at least some of which
would likely be held only by the government.
In sum, an action for an accounting, separated from a claim for money damages,
is now limited by Jicarilla Apache to securing only those records that the
government is required to disclose by specific statutory direction. The scope of the
claim consequently is limited and no longer may be augmented by judiciallyfashioned duties. In any event, the remedy for an accounting claim in District Court
under the APA certainly would be no broader (and perhaps narrower) than an
accounting or its equivalent that could be obtained as collateral relief in a suit in the
Court of Federal Claims for a money judgment or as part of discovery under the
Tucker Act or the Indian Tucker Act.304
d. The Doubtful Availability of a Restitutionary Monetary Remedy under the APA
Plaintiffs with disputes against the federal government that are essentially
economic in nature—and who wish not only to evade the Tucker Act jurisdiction of
the Court of Federal Claims, but also to secure an order by the District Court for the
payment of money under the APA—frequently frame their pleas as requests for
restitution. By asking for what they characterize as an equitable restitutionary
remedy, these plaintiffs seek to avoid the “money damages” exclusion of § 702 of
the APA. In this way, these plaintiffs hope both to retain the District Court as the
venue for their cause of action against the federal government and to obtain an
award of money without resort to the Court of Federal Claims.

303. White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. at 478–79.
304. On the collateral equitable-type powers of the CFC, see supra notes 247–256 and
accompanying text.
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The “restitution” gambit for obtaining payment of past-due money under the
APA has been tried repeatedly in the various federal courts, with decidedly mixed
success.305 And this restitution-as-not-money-damages argument became a central
feature of the post-Cobell Indian breach of trust lawsuits in District Court.
Even if an accounting cause of action remains viable as a strict APA claim,
tribal claims in the future for an accounting in District Court likely will be
restricted to obtaining the disclosure of information and perhaps reconciliation of
account balances as specifically mandated by statute or regulation. Claims for
monetary relief for mistakes in trust accounts, whether styled as claims for
“equitable restitution” or as other common-law or equity claims, likely are not
cognizable in District Court.
Navajo Nation and Jicarilla Apache plainly preclude the creation of legal or
equitable causes of action or remedies that are not grounded directly in a statute.306
Especially since a monetary cause of action and money judgment remedy is directly
and expressly available in the CFC through the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker
Act, inference of a supposed equitable monetary claim or remedy in the District
Court is increasingly implausible.
To begin with, the suggestion that characterizing a remedy as “equitable” will
bring it within the parameters of the APA is confused.307 Lawyers and judges
frequently describe the judicial review powers of the District Court under the APA
as being “equitable” in nature, probably because a court may enforce an APA
ruling overturning agency action by issuing an injunction, and to contrast APA
relief from excluded “money damages,”308 which traditionally was a legal remedy.

305. See, e.g., Hubbard v. EPA, 982 F.2d 531, 538–39 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(rejecting claim that back pay in federal civilian employment dispute could be sought under
the APA as “restitution”); Zellous v. Broadhead Assocs., 906 F.2d 94, 96–100 (3d Cir. 1990)
(permitting low-income tenants to pursue “retrospective restitution” under the APA for
having had to pay higher rents to housing projects under federal rent subsidy because the
government failed to timely adjust the tenants’ utility allowances); Witt v. U.S. Dep’t. of Air
Force, No. C06-519RBL, 2010 WL 3522519, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 7, 2010) (holding that
back pay and retirement credits sought by discharged service member was beyond authority
of the court under the APA); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Veneman, 355 F. Supp. 2d 181, 192–96
(D.D.C. 2005) (holding that sugar producers seeking reimbursement of money paid to the
government in allegedly unlawful higher interest rate for sugar price support loans were
“entitled to restitution under the APA” as specific relief rather than money damages), rev’d
on other grounds, 437 F.3d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Leistiko v. Sec’y of the Army, 922 F.
Supp. 66, 72 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (rejecting discharged National Guard technician’s claim that
his APA suit for lost wages and benefits was for “equitable restitution” and not for excluded
money damages); Int’l Marine Carriers v. Oil Spill Liab. Trust Fund, 903 F. Supp. 1097,
1102 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that operator of vessel challenging denial of claim for
reimbursement for certain oil removal costs from a government-operated trust fund was
seeking “restitution, not damages” and could proceed under the APA).
306. See supra Part II.B.3.b.
307. See Hubbard, 982 F.2d at 537 (explaining in a federal employment dispute that
“reliance on cases calling back pay ‘equitable’ for other purposes is . . . misplaced,” because
the “crucial question” is not whether a remedy is equitable but whether it constitutes specific
relief that falls outside the exclusion of “money damages” from the APA).
308. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
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However, “[w]hat may qualify as an ‘equitable remedy’” in other contexts “is not
synonymous with specific relief,” which is available under the APA.309
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Department of the Army v. Blue Fox,
Inc.,310 the APA allows a court to grant “specific relief” that is not “substitute
relief” and does “not turn on distinctions between ‘equitable’ actions and other
actions.”311 A court’s power of judicial review over agency action does not arise
from inherent equitable (or common-law) powers, but rather from a grant of
authority by the terms of the APA itself.
Even though an order issued by a court under the judicial review provisions of
the APA sometimes may overlap with an equitable remedy, the APA remedy is
properly characterized as one for specific relief and as focused on review of
particular agency action. Thus, for example, in Bowen v. Massachusetts,312 the
Supreme Court approved an order of specific relief under the APA that reversed a
federal agency’s disallowance of a state request for reimbursement under the
Medicaid federal-state financial participation program.313 The specific relief
allowed in Bowen bore some resemblance to the equitable remedy of restitution
because it restored money to which the state was entitled by statute.314 However,
even the Bowen Court did not appear to regard the relief granted as having a pastdue monetary effect, but rather as modifying prospective government practices
through adjustments of future advances in revolving accounts for funding the
federal-state Medicaid program.315 Indeed, the Bowen Court regarded a money
judgment as inadequate in that case, given the need “for prospective relief
fashioned in the light of the rather complex ongoing relationship between” the
federal government and the state.316 As the bottom line in Bowen, the specific relief
granted under the APA constituted the undoing of the agency’s action in
disallowing an expense, not a grant of a general restitutionary remedy for an
equitable purpose.
And, lest there be any lingering questions about the nature and scope of APA
relief, the Supreme Court in Blue Fox clarified that courts should not
misunderstand Bowen or misconstrue the APA “as waiving immunity from all
actions that are equitable in nature.”317

309. Hubbard, 982 F.2d at 537.
310. 525 U.S. 255 (1999).
311. Id. at 261–62.
312. 487 U.S. 879 (1988); see supra Part I.B.
313. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 892–901.
314. Indeed, the Medicaid statute at issue in Bowen labeled the reversal of a disallowance
as “restitution,” id. at 893, even though there is no suggestion that the Medicaid statute
thereby incorporated general equitable remedies. In any event, because the state-plaintiff in
Bowen was not seeking the return of its own wrongly appropriated funds from the federal
government, specific restitution in equity would not have been available, as discussed below.
315. See Kanemoto v. Reno, 41 F.3d 641, 645 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (describing the relief
involved in Bowen as “requir[ing] the Secretary to modify future Medicaid practices”
(emphasis in original)).
316. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 905.
317. Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999) (explaining further
that the term “equitable” is “found nowhere” in § 702 of the APA).
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So understood, an equitable claim for “restitution” or “disgorgement,” such as
that raised by tribes in the post-Cobell litigation in District Court,318 is difficult to
shoehorn into the APA as a request for “specific relief.” Indeed, the “equitable
lien” device—which the Supreme Court refused to recognize under the APA in
Blue Fox—is of the same equitable species as the equitable constructive trust
device that gives rise to the remedy of specific restitution.319 Whether characterized
as an equitable lien, a constructive trust, or a specific restitutionary remedy, when
the remedy sought is “merely a means to the end of satisfying a claim for the
recovery of money,” then the Supreme Court has confirmed that it is not a proper
request for specific relief under the APA but instead falls into the exclusion for
“money damages.”320
Even if the APA did generally encompass equitable claims and remedies, tribal
claims in breach of trust cases likely do not state a proper request for a
restitutionary cause of action or remedy, unless strictly limited to the recovery of
specifically identifiable funds that the government still possesses. When a tribal
plaintiff contends that the government has lost funds that should have been held in
trust for a tribe, the request for reimbursement probably would not be classified as
specific restitution because the plaintiff’s missing funds could not “clearly be
traced to particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.”321 When “‘the
property sought to be recovered or its proceeds have been dissipated so that no
product remains,’”322 the claim may sound in restitution, but it is restitution at law
and not equity and is remedied by an ordinary money judgment. As the Supreme
Court said in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, “not all relief
falling under the rubric of restitution is available in equity.”323
When the funds to which a plaintiff lays claim cannot be traced to a specific res
(such that the court effectively finds the identifiable property to belong to the
plaintiff), then specific restitution is not available.324 When the defendant is the

318. See Complaint at Prayer ¶¶ 1, 6, Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian
Reservation v. Norton, 527 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 06-2236-JR) (D.D.C.).
319. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3(3) (2d ed. 1993) (explaining that “[t]he
equitable lien . . . is essentially a special, and limited, form of the constructive trust”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 56 cmt. a (2011)
(“Equitable lien is sometimes described as a subspecies of constructive trust: whereas
constructive trust (§ 55) transfers actual ownership of specific property from the holder of
legal title to a person with a superior claim, equitable lien subjects the holder’s property to a
security interest in favor of the claimant.”).
320. See Blue Fox, 525 U.S. at 262–63; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 56 cmt. a (2011) (describing “the function of equitable lien” as
being “to secure the defendant's obligation to make a money payment”).
321. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002).
322. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 215 cmt. a (1936)).
323. Id. at 212; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt. a (2011) (“The status of restitution as belonging to law or to equity
has been ambiguous from the outset. The answer is that restitution may be either or both.”);
Douglas Laycock, Restoring Restitution to the Canon, 110 MICH. L. REV. 929, 931 (2012)
(describing the new Restatement (Third) of Restitution as “correcting the common
misconception that restitution is necessarily equitable”).
324. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 319, § 6.1(3). The majority and traditional view under the
law of restitution insists that “tracing of the plaintiff’s funds into identifiable property” is

2013]

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS

125

United States, the equitable concept of tracing is of doubtful application. With the
federal government, unless the particular funds belonging to a claimant can be
identified in a discrete account (even if commingled with other funds), monies to
recompense for lost funds will come from the public treasury and ultimately be
paid by taxpayers. Under the traditional law of restitution as applied to private
defendants, when “the tracing is incomplete,” then no res can be identified and no
specific restitution is available, leaving the plaintiff instead in the position of a
“simple debtor” who has a legal claim for money damages.325
Not surprisingly, then, “[t]he vast majority of restitution claims are both legal
and substitutionary, with the plaintiff entitled to no more than a money judgment
serving as the measured substitute of the defendant’s unjustly retained benefit.”326
Indeed, even the Cobell District Court recognized that a claim by the Indian trust
account claimants for reimbursement of lost trust funds would be compensatory in
nature—and thus outside the scope of the APA—if “the money is missing from the
trust.”327 Importantly, the United States has waived sovereign immunity for claims
seeking such a money judgment—but only under the Tucker Act and in the Court
of Federal Claims.
Whether characterized as equitable or legal in nature, “restitution” as an
independent remedy simply is not available under the APA. The general law of
restitution “is the law relating to all claims, quasi-contractual or otherwise, which
are founded upon the principle of unjust enrichment.”328 No statutory waiver of
essential, requiring more than showing merely that the defendant’s assets were, at some
point in time, “swollen or ‘augmented’ by the plaintiff’s money.” Id.; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 58 cmt. e (2011) (“The doctrine [of
swollen assets] is uniformly rejected in modern U.S. law. Even if the court is satisfied that
the assets available for distribution have in fact been ‘swollen’ by an admixture of the
claimant’s property, the claimant’s right to restitution from property is lost if the claimant’s
property cannot be traced.”). When the defendant is the U.S. government, especially during
an era of budgetary deficits and expanding national debt, the suggestion that a claimant’s lost
assets have enriched the United States in a meaningful way is difficult to sustain. And,
unlike a private entity, the costs and liabilities of the United States ultimately are paid by the
taxpayers, not individuals or constituents of a commercial enterprise that have been unjustly
enriched. Importantly, aside from the law of restitution, the inability to trace lost funds
hardly excuses the defendant from liability. Instead, the defendant remains liable at law for a
money judgment, just as the United States remains liable for a money judgment in the CFC
when it has taken and dissipated trust assets.
325. 1 DOBBS, supra note 319, § 4.3(2).
326. Pasman-Green & Derrossett, supra note 242, at 754; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49 (2011) (explaining that when a defendant has
wrongly been enriched by a money payment and the claimant is entitled to restitution, the
claimant “may obtain a judgment for money”).
327. Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 28 (D.D.C. 1999) (“At most, the enforcement of
this statutory right [to an accounting] may partially support some future monetary claim (but
not necessarily ‘money damages’), which, because this is plaintiffs’ own money, will only be
compensatory to the extent that the money is missing from the trust.”), aff’d sub nom. Cobell
v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
328. LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 3 (3d ed.
1986); see also Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1226 (1995)
(“The simplest possible account of the law of restitution . . . will describe it as the branch of
civil liability that is based on and measured by the unjust enrichment of the defendant at the
expense of the plaintiff.”).
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federal sovereign immunity authorizes any general or independent cause of action
for restitution or unjust enrichment against the United States. The United States has
not subjected itself to liability under general theories of equity or law, divorced
from a specific statutory cause of action and accompanying statutory remedy.
With the foregoing in mind, if a person or tribe alleged inaccurate trust account
balances because funds mistakenly had been deposited into one account instead of
another or had been misallocated between recipients, specific relief under the APA
might be available to order the necessary and simple shifting of funds. In Bowen,
the Supreme Court similarly described the specific relief in that case as merely
“adjustments in the open account” by which the federal government reimbursed
states for Medicaid expenses.329 While the Cobell litigation ultimately was resolved
with a broad-based monetary and compensatory settlement, the District Court
earlier described the complaint as seeking merely a reconciliation of trust fund
accounts, alleging that “the money is in the account but the ledger cannot be
properly kept, so the stated balance is incorrect. In the plaintiffs’ view, they only
seek to balance the checkbook, not add any money to the checking account.”330
Although the true nature of the litigation was revealed at the end, the plaintiffs in
Cobell insisted in the early stages that they did “not seek an additional infusion of
money.”331
By contrast, if the money owed to a Native American or tribe never had been
properly deposited into any trust account or had been misplaced or misappropriated
thereafter, the necessary infusion of cash from the public treasury—whether
characterized as “restitution” or something else—would be much more difficult to
characterize as “specific relief.”332 The relief sought would involve more than
simply overturning an agency’s erroneous decision under APA review provisions.
And because the use of generally appropriated public funds to reimburse claimants
for specific trust funds lost by the government would be a substitutionary remedy,
it should be characterized as “money damages” and thereby excluded from the
APA, even under the Bowen analysis.333
At the end of the day, such a supposedly “restitutionary” remedy for misplaced
trust account funds is simply a type of money judgment, which readily could be
heard in the Court of Federal Claims.334 Moreover, no one contends that profits lost

329. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 893 (1988).
330. Cobell v. Babbitt, 30 F. Supp. 2d 24, 39 (D.D.C. 1998).
331. Id.
332. But see Murphy, supra note 70, at 144 (arguing that monetary remedies are “specific
relief” if “the plaintiff’s original entitlement under the substantive law is that the defendant
pay money to the plaintiff,” but disavowing “any judgment about whether claims against the
federal government for these types of specific monetary remedies fall within the jurisdiction
of the federal district courts under the APA or, instead, within the jurisdiction of another
court under these statutes”).
333. See supra Part I.B.
334. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 900 n.31 (explaining that the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
Claims is not limited to “money damages” that are substitutionary in effect); id. at 917 n.2
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the CFC has jurisdiction over claims for restitutionary
damages); Kanemoto v. Reno, 41 F.3d 641, 646 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that the Supreme
Court in Bowen “recognized that the Tucker Act is not limited to suits for money damages”
and “reaffirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction over causes of action for payment
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by a tribe or individual because the federal government failed to properly invest
trust funds would be anything other than “money damages,” relief that is expressly
excluded under the APA.335 Again, while such requests for relief fall outside the
scope of the APA and are beyond the authority of the District Court, the doors of
the CFC courthouse have been open to those monetary relief claims.
In sum, a request for “restitution” or “disgorgement,” whether sounding in
equity or the common law, likely falls outside the parameters of the APA, which is
limited to specific relief directed at final agency action reviewed under the
standards of the APA. Blue Fox clarified that the APA does not waive immunity
generally for equitable claims or remedies, and Jicarilla Apache confirmed that
cognizable rights may not be judicially crafted but must be specified in the
governing statute. For these reasons, an accounting claim under the APA may not
encompass a request for restitution when such an award involves the substitution of
new money to compensate for dissipated funds—even aside from the withdrawal of
judicial review under the APA when a Tucker Act remedy is available.
Given that Congress has designed a specific monetary remedy for Indian breach
of trust claims in the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act, claims for money—
whether framed as money damages, restitution, or disgorgement—must be pursued
under that vehicle and in the CFC.
e. Inference of Remedy for Breach of Trust Claims Tied to the Special Nature of
Indian Tucker Act
Somewhat ironically, in the post-Cobell litigation, tribal plaintiffs urged the
District Court to infer the existence of an independent accounting claim in equity
by citing Indian breach of trust decisions that had been pursued under the Tucker
Act and comfortably within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
Claims. Observing that the Supreme Court has recognized a right to sue for
damages as implied in federal statutes establishing a fiduciary relationship, these
tribal plaintiffs have cited336 such decisions as United States v. Mitchell337 and
United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe.338 By invoking these decisions,
which turn on the particular character of the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker as
statutory waivers of sovereign immunity, the tribes’ argument proves too much and
tellingly confirms the CFC as the proper venue.

of money”); see also Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007 (Cl. Ct.
1967) (describing Tucker Act remedy in CFC when “the value sued for was improperly paid,
exacted, or taken from the claimant in contravention of the Constitution, a statute, or a
regulation”).
335. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 18, at 9, 45 (acknowledging that the
government’s alleged breach of the duty to maximize investment profits from trust accounts
gives rise to a cause of action for money damages within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Federal Claims).
336. Plaintiffs’ Principal Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 263, at 3, 22; Plaintiffs’ Joint Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for
Remand and Stay of Litigation, supra note 265, at 44.
337. 463 U.S. 206, 214 (1983).
338. 537 U.S. 465 (2003).
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As discussed earlier,339 the foundation for landmark Indian breach of trust
claims resolved by the Supreme Court has been the Tucker Act or the Indian
Tucker Act. These two statutes waive federal sovereign immunity and expressly
authorize litigation against the United States. Neither statute creates a substantive
cause of action, which instead must be derived from another “money-mandating”
statute or from the existence of a fiduciary relationship grounded in rights- or
duties-creating statutory language.340 However, and importantly, even a genuine
right-creating statute does not give rise to a cause of action that is independent of
the Tucker Act or the Indian Tucker Act.
As a general rule, for any civil suit against any defendant to proceed, the
Supreme Court has said it must “interpret the statute Congress has passed to
determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a
private remedy.”341 Thus, in most circumstances, that a reader might infer a
substantive right from a statute gives rise to no enforceable legal claim, if the
statute does not also include explicit language contemplating a remedy in court for
a deprivation of that substantive right.
In the special context of the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act, however, the
federal statute from which the substantive right is inferred need not also include an
express private right of action. The right to seek a judicial remedy has already been
supplied by the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act. In Indian breach of trust
cases, such as Mitchell and White Mountain Apache,342 when the right-creating
statute confirms a fiduciary relationship, the Supreme Court not only has found a
cause of action but also has drawn on general trust principles to imply a damages
remedy. But, again, those decisions are anchored in the special nature of the Tucker
Act and the Indian Tucker Act, which provide for adjudication of recognized
claims in the special venue of the Court of Federal Claims.
The tribal plaintiffs in the post-Cobell District Court litigation are correct to this
extent: there is a private right of action for Indian breach of trust claims against the
United States and it is independent of the APA. But that independent private right
of action is found in the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act. And, in both the
Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act, the very language that facilitates the
enforcement of the right and remedy against the United States also reposits subject
matter jurisdiction in the CFC.
The road for an Indian breach of trust claim arising from the federal
government’s management of Indian assets or funds runs directly through the
Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act and leads without detour to the Court of
Federal Claims.
* * *
Whatever the theoretical viability or scope of a cause of action for an accounting
of Indian trust assets, it hardly is surprising that such a claim does not fit
comfortably under the APA. Instead, as the Supreme Court recognized nearly thirty

339.
340.
341.
342.

See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part II.B.1.
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. at 477; Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 226.
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years ago, “Indians were to be given ‘their fair day in court so that they can call the
various Government agencies to account on the obligations that the Federal
government assumed’” by Congress’s enactment of that specific waiver of
sovereign immunity commonly known as the Indian Tucker Act.343
Because Congress designed a specially tailored remedy for Indian breach of
trust claims in the Court of Federal Claims through the Indian Tucker Act, yet
another limitation on APA review in District Court is implicated. Section 702
precludes APA review “if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or
impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.”344 Thus, for example, “[t]he waiver of
sovereign immunity in the Administrative Procedure Act does not run to actions
seeking declaratory relief or specific performance in [government] contract cases”
because “the Tucker Act and Little Tucker Act impliedly forbid such relief.”345
Likewise, the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity is withdrawn for Indian breach
of trust claims when a money judgment could be sought under the Indian Tucker
Act, which thus “impliedly forbids” bypassing the particular remedy created by
Congress and the particular forum that Congress designated.
III. THE JURISDICTIONAL COLLISION IN UNITED STATES V. TOHONO O’ODHAM NATION
A. Duplicative Litigation in Both the District Court and the Court of Federal
Claims
The projection of District Court authority over Indian breach of trust litigation in
Cobell v. Babbit346 opened the floodgates at the E. Barrett Prettyman Federal
Courthouse in Washington, D.C. Dozens of suits alleging mismanagement by the
government of Indian assets and funds are now pending before the District Court
for the District of Columbia.347 Setting the stage for a jurisdictional collision, in
thirty-one instances, American Indian tribes filed pairs of breach of trust suits in
both the CFC and in the District Court.348 Although the United States reached a $1
billion settlement of breach of trust claims with forty-one tribes in April 2012,349
dozens of other suits alleging mismanagement of tribal accounts by the federal

343. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 214 (quoting 92 CONG. REC. 5312 (1946) (statement of Rep.
Jackson)).
344. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
345. Sharp v. Weinberger, 798 F.2d 1521, 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.); see also
B.K. Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713, 727–28 (2d Cir. 1983); Sea-Land Serv.,
Inc. v. Brown, 600 F.2d 429, 432–33 (3d Cir. 1979).
346. 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24–28 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 240 F.3d 1081, 1094–95 (D.C. Cir.
2001); see supra Part II.A.
347. See Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Norton, 527 F. Supp. 2d 130, 133–34 (D.D.C.
2007) (listing cases). Indian breach of trust cases seeking an accounting have also been filed
in the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. See, e.g., Tonkawa Tribe v.
Kempthorne, No. CIV-06-1435-F, 2009 WL 742896, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 17, 2009);
Otoe-Missouria Tribe v. Kempthorne, No. CIV-06-1436-C, 2008 WL 5205191, at *4 (W.D.
Okla. Dec. 10, 2008).
348. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 94a–99a, United States v. Tohono O’odham
Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011) (No. 09-846).
349. Timothy Williams, U.S. Will Pay a Settlement of $1 Billion to 41 Tribes, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2012, at A12.
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government continue forward, most of which are more complex and could require
larger monetary payments to resolve.350
When lawsuits against the United States involving the same events or set of
circumstances are pending simultaneously in both the Court of Federal Claims and
another court, 28 U.S.C. § 1500351 is implicated. Section 1500 prohibits the Court
of Federal Claims from exercising jurisdiction “of any claim for or in respect to
which the plaintiff . . . has pending in any other court any suit or process against the
United States.”352
The predecessor to § 1500 was enacted by Congress in the aftermath of the Civil
War to address duplicative litigation filed against the federal government and
federal officers by the so-called Cotton Claimants.353 The Supreme Court
summarized the “lineage” of this statutory text in Keene Corporation v. United
States:354
[R]esidents of the Confederacy who had involuntarily parted with
property (usually cotton) during the war sued the United States for
compensation in the Court of Claims, under the Abandoned Property
Collection Act. When these cotton claimants had difficulty meeting the
statutory condition that they must have given no aid or comfort to
participants in the rebellion, they resorted to separate suits in other
courts seeking compensation not from the Government as such but
from federal officials, and not under the statutory cause of action but on
tort theories such as conversion. It was these duplicative lawsuits that
induced Congress to prohibit anyone from filing or prosecuting in the
Court of Claims “any claim . . . for or in respect to which he . . . shall
have commenced and has pending” an action in any other court against
an officer or agent of the United States. The statute has long outlived
the cotton claimants . . . .355
Reading § 1500 in a manner that ameliorates perceived hardships for plaintiffs
who wish to seek relief against the federal government in different courts, when

350. Id. (“About 60 other similar lawsuits by tribes against the United States have not been
settled, the government said.”). Compare Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 130–
32 (listing consolidated tribal breach of trust suits pending in District Court in 2007) with Dep’t
of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Attorney General Holder and Secretary Salazar Announce $1
Billion Settlement of Tribal Trust Accounting and Management Lawsuits Filed by More Than
40 Tribes (Apr. 11, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-ag460.html [hereinafter Department of Justice, $1 Billion Settlement] (listing forty-one tribes
with which settlement had been reached).
351. See generally Paul Frederic Kirgis, Section 1500 and the Jurisdictional Pitfalls of
Federal Government Litigation, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 301 (1997).
352. 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (2006).
353. See generally Payson R. Peabody, Thomas K. Gump & Michael S. Weinstein, A
Confederate Ghost That Haunts the Federal Courts: The Case for Repeal of 28 U.S.C. §
1500, 4 FED. CIR. B.J. 95 (1994); Schwartz, supra note 239, at 4, 7–8; David Schwartz,
Section 1500 of the Judicial Code and Duplicate Suits Against the Government and Its
Agents, 55 GEO. L.J. 537, 574–80 (1967).
354. 508 U.S. 200 (1993).
355. Id. at 206 (citations omitted).
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jurisdictional limitations preclude joining the claims in a single lawsuit,356 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit adopted two narrow
interpretations (characterized by detractors as judicially crafted exceptions) that
drained much of the force from the statute.357
First, the court held that a later-filed District Court suit does not oust the Court
of Federal Claims of jurisdiction to hear a prior-filed Tucker Act claim.358 Thus,
under Federal Circuit precedent, the application of § 1500 turns entirely on the
order of filing. If the CFC takes jurisdiction over a lawsuit at a point in time in
which no parallel litigation is pending in another court, that jurisdictional authority
is not lost by the subsequent filing, even just a day or perhaps hours later, in
District Court of an action based on the same set of facts. Because this
interpretation originated from a decision by the old Court of Claims in Tecon
Engineers v. United States,359 the order-of-filing holding is frequently called the
Tecon rule or exception.
Second, the Federal Circuit did not regard a District Court lawsuit as “for or in
respect” to an action in the CFC if the two lawsuits sought distinctly different
relief. Thus, for example, if a lawsuit sought specific relief from the United States
under the APA in District Court, while a simultaneous lawsuit sought money
damages under the Tucker Act in the CFC, § 1500 would not bar the CFC from
proceeding despite the pending District Court action.360 The different-relief
holding, which also originated under the old Court of Claims in Casman v. United
States,361 was sometimes called the Casman rule or exception.
In United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation,362 an Indian Nation filed suit in the
District Court, alleging that the government had breached its duties of trust by
mismanaging tribal assets and money.363 In the District Court, the Nation sought an
accounting of the government’s management of tribal assets, as well as equitable
restitution of any assets not properly maintained for the tribe.364 On the very next
day, the Nation filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, again alleging a breach of
trust by the government, but here seeking the remedy of money damages.365

356. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(en banc) (Mayer, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he history of section 1500 is replete with
instances where courts sought to temper perceived inequity by inventing exceptions to the
rule”).
357. Compare UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(“[S]ection 1500 is rife with judicially created exceptions and rationalizations to the point
that it no longer serves its purposes . . . .”), aff’d on other grounds, 508 U.S. 200 (1993), with
Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 27 F.3d at 1551 (saying that the description of such a rule “as an
‘exception’ to § 1500 is inapt” but rather “reflect[s] a carefully considered interpretation of
the statutory term ‘claims,’ a term undefined in the statute and subject to conflicting views as
to its meaning”).
358. Hardwick Bros. Co. II v. United States, 72 F.3d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1995). For a critique
of the Tecon order-of-filing rule, see infra Part III.B.2.c.
359. 343 F.2d 943, 946 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
360. Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 27 F.3d at 1547–52.
361. 135 Ct. Cl. 647, 650 (1956).
362. 131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011).
363. Id. at 1727.
364. Id.
365. Id.
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Because both lawsuits arose out of the same factual circumstances—both
complaints offered nearly identical allegations of breach of trust366—and because
the Nation sought monetary relief in both courts, the CFC dismissed the suit under
§ 1500.367 A divided Federal Circuit reversed, with the majority holding that, even
though both lawsuits presumably arose out of the same underlying facts and both
sought relief in the form of money, the District Court lawsuit was framed in equity
to seek restitution of “old money” (lost trust funds) and the CFC lawsuit was
framed in law to seek damages for “new money” (lost profits) and thus sought
different relief.368
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Tohono O’odham Nation to resolve
“what it means for two suits to be ‘for or in respect to’ the same claim” within the
meaning of § 1500.369 Speaking for a five-justice majority, Justice Kennedy
dispensed with comparisons of the types of relief sought or legal theories presented
in the two lawsuits and ruled that § 1500 turns solely on the question of whether
both lawsuits arise out of the same operative facts.370 The statutory language of “for
or in respect to” the same claim means simply that both suits have a substantial
factual overlap—“based on substantially the same operative facts”371—regardless
of whether the remedial requests overlap as well. Characterizing Congress as
having made “a robust response to the problem first presented by the cotton
claimants,”372 the Court held the statute should be read broadly to protect the
government from the “burdens of redundant litigation.”373
Thus, in the Court’s words, “a common factual basis” for both lawsuits “suffices
to bar jurisdiction under § 1500.”374 By this standard, the Tohono O’odham
Nation’s lawsuit in the CFC inevitably had to be dismissed.375 Because the CFC
action had been filed after the District Court lawsuit, the Court noted that the Tecon
time-of-filing question was not presented in the case.376
Concurring in the judgment in Tohono O’odham Nation, Justice Sotomayor
(joined by Justice Breyer) would have reversed on the alternative ground that the
two lawsuits by the Nation requested overlapping relief, as both sought monetary
relief, thus requiring dismissal of the CFC lawsuit under § 1500.377 The concurring
justices would have reserved the question of whether § 1500 applies when both
lawsuits involve the same operative facts but entirely different relief, although they
indicated their belief that “Congress did not intend for § 1500 to put plaintiffs to a
choice between two nonduplicative remedies that Congress has made available

366. See id.
367. Id. at 1731.
368. Tohono O’odham Nation v. United States, 559 F.3d 1284, 1289–90 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
369. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1727.
370. Id. at 1728–31.
371. Id. at 1731.
372. Id. at 1728.
373. Id. at 1730.
374. Id. at 1727.
375. See id. at 1731. Subsequently, the Tohono O’odham Nation’s breach of trust claim
was among those tribal claims settled by the United States in April 2012. Department of
Justice, $1 Billion Settlement, supra note 350.
376. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1729–30.
377. Id. at 1732–33 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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exclusively in two forums.”378 Justice Ginsburg was the sole dissenter, arguing that
the CFC should have disregarded the plaintiff’s requests for relief that overlapped
with that in the District Court or allowed the plaintiff to amend the complaint to do
so.379 Justice Kagan was recused.
B. The Aftermath of Tohono O’odham Nation
1. The General Implications of Tohono O’odham Nation for Election of Claim
Theory and Remedies
The Tohono O’odham Nation interpretation of § 1500 has significant
implications for claimants against the federal government in certain substantive and
procedural contexts—potentially forcing an election of legal theory and even of
remedy. Harsh consequences ordinarily can be avoided, and the practical
implications of the jurisdictional bar thus are limited to a small set of claimants in
certain circumstances. Nonetheless, when it does come into force, § 1500 may
rather severely constrain the course of action or the remedies available to a
claimant against the United States.
Interestingly, however, in the Tohono O’odham Nation case itself, the
jurisdictional collision could and should have been avoided.380 As emphasized
throughout this Article, the Indian breach of trust action should have been filed in a
single forum—the Court of Federal Claims—seeking both a money judgment and
collateral relief for a correction of any errors in the government’s accounting for
trust funds.
Controversies involving § 1500 arise in cases in which a single occurrence or set
of occurrences give rise to claims based on multiple legal theories that may be
framed as different, alternative, or succeeding causes of action, one or more of
which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims and
another for which jurisdiction is conferred upon the District Court. Consider a case
in which a plaintiff’s pleading for substantial damages could be formulated either
as a contract claim against the federal government under the Tucker Act, or as a tort
claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).381 The
District Court cannot hear contract claims under the Tucker Act seeking more than
$10,000, authority over which is vested exclusively in the CFC.382 And the CFC
cannot hear tort claims against the federal government because the Tucker Act
specifically excludes cases “sounding in tort,”383 while the FTCA provides for
jurisdiction in the District Court.384 Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot join these
claims together in a single suit in a single court, for that would defeat the singular
prerogative of the other court to hear that type of claim. Neither the District Court

378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id. at 1735.
Id. at 1739–40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See infra Part III.B.2.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674–80 (2006).
Id. § 1346(a)(2).
Id. § 1491(a)(1).
Id. § 1346(b)(1).
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nor the CFC may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim that lies within
the exclusive province of the other court.
This forum divergence between the Tucker Act and the FTCA describes the
circumstances behind the Supreme Court’s previous encounter with § 1500 in
Keene Corp. v. United States385 in 1993. In that case, asbestos manufacturers
sought to shift liability to the United States for judgments and settlements paid by
the manufacturers to shipyard employees. Arguing that the asbestos had been used
pursuant to government specifications, the manufacturers asserted against the
United States (1) contract indemnification theories based on a purported implied
warranty (which stated a cause of action under the Tucker Act within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the CFC), and (2) tort-based indemnification or reimbursement
theories such as contribution (which came under the FTCA with jurisdiction only in
the District Court).386 Although the manufacturers could not join these two claims
together in a single forum, the Supreme Court held in Keene that the CFC could not
take jurisdiction when a lawsuit “based on substantially the same operative facts”
had been pending in District Court.387
a. Section 1500 and Election of Legal Theory
Through the Keene decision, the Supreme Court interpreted § 1500 to force
claimants in some circumstances to elect a particular legal theory (and abandon
another) by which to pursue what is essentially the same claim for the same relief
against the United States. Consider a plaintiff who is prosecuting a tort-based claim
for damages against the federal government in District Court and then finds itself
pressing against the statute of limitations for filing a contract breach or other nontort money claim in the Court of Federal Claims. In such a circumstance, the
plaintiff must decide whether to press forward with the pending FTCA claim in the
District Court or to dismiss the FTCA vehicle for compensation to instead pursue
the Tucker Act claim in the Court of Federal Claims—but not both.388
The impact of § 1500 in such instances is thus material, albeit limited as a
practical matter to only a few cases:
First, given the unusually long limitations period for actions to be filed in the
CFC—six years389—the odds are that most FTCA actions in District Court will
have concluded before the plaintiff must initiate a timely suit in the CFC. However,
given that the pendency of an FTCA claim for § 1500 purposes includes not only
the period from the filing of a pleading through the final judgment in the District

385. 508 U.S. 200 (1993).
386. Id. at 202–05.
387. Id. at 210–14.
388. Compare UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(“[W]e see no harm in requiring a party to carefully assess his claims before filing and
choose the forum best suited to the merits of the claims and the applicable statutes of
limitations.”) with Emily Schleicher Bremer & Jonathan R. Siegel, The Need to Reform §
1500, at 36 (Final Report, U.S. Admin. Conf., Sept. 19, 2012), at http://www.acus.gov/wpcontent/plugins/download-monitor/download.php?id=749 (arguing that letting “a plaintiff
with multiple claims against the United States arising out of a single incident . . . to pursue
all such claims” is “consistent with fundamental principles of our legal system and is just”).
389. 28 U.S.C. § 2501.
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Court, but also the later disposition of any appeal, occasions may arise in which the
FTCA matter is not concluded before the plaintiff must consider whether to file or
waive the Tucker Act claim in the Court of Federal Claims (and Keene itself is an
example of that scenario made real).390
Second, if the legal theories—such as tort versus contract—are equally strong or
weak, forcing the plaintiff to a choice will not affect the ultimate outcome of
obtaining or failing to obtain a full compensatory remedy. However, the viability of
a legal theory is not always readily apparent on the front end, especially before
discovery and preliminary rulings by a court. The legal theory initially selected
may prove later to be flawed such that the other legal theory then looks more
promising. Thus, an election of legal theory can affect the ability to obtain success.
In most but not all cases, the comparative strengths of alternative legal theories will
become apparent well before the six years have run, so, again, a forced choice of a
legal theory may not be a major obstacle to the success of most meritorious claims.
b. Section 1500 and Election of Remedy
Section 1500 as interpreted in Keene could well force an election of a particular
legal theory, depending upon whether the statute of limitations were to expire
during the pendency of the first suit. However, if a plaintiff in a Keene-type
scenario—choosing between a FTCA suit in District Court and a Tucker Act suit in
the CFC—makes a wise choice of legal theory, the plaintiff would obtain a full
recovery. Under both the FTCA and the Tucker Act, the remedy is a money
judgment.
By contrast, forcing election of a remedy by barring simultaneous suits that seek
different relief in separate forums with exclusive authority could preclude full
recovery notwithstanding the merits of the case. For example, a party cannot obtain
money damages in the District Court under the APA391 and cannot obtain general
equitable-type relief disconnected from a money claim in the CFC under the Tucker
Act.392 If the second suit cannot be brought because the statute of limitations will
have run before conclusion of the first suit, then the second suit may be precluded
along with the additional remedy available only in that second suit.
Through Tohono O’odham Nation, the Supreme Court has interpreted § 1500 in
a manner that may, sometimes, force a plaintiff to a choice of remedies, thus
impairing the prospect of a full recovery. As discussed above and below,393 the
Tohono O’odham Nation case itself was not an example of such a forced selection
of remedies, because an Indian breach of trust claim may be fully remedied under
the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act. Other situations could arise, however, in
which a party would be forced to elect a remedy, and not merely a legal theory,
thus requiring not only a choice of means but of ends in litigation against the
federal government.

390. See Keene Corp., 508 U.S. at 207–09 (holding that § 1500 barred CFC action when
FTCA appeal was pending when CFC action was filed, even though the FTCA appeal later
was dismissed).
391. 28 U.S.C. § 702 (allowing relief “other than money damages”); see supra Part I.A.
392. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a); see supra Parts I.A–II.B.2.
393. See supra Part II.B.2–3; see also infra Part III.B.2.
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This classic scenario presented itself in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States.394 In that case, plaintiff landowners were aggrieved by federal
administrative restrictions on the development of wetlands.395 To challenge the
denial of a development permit, the plaintiffs were obliged to seek APA review in
the District Court of the agency’s action.396 The APA claim challenging the
agency’s refusal to grant the permit to develop the land could not have been
pursued in the CFC because it was not a claim for money (nor was it merely a
means to the end of monetary relief).397 When it appeared that the APA challenge
to the permit might be unsuccessful—but while that challenge was still pending on
appeal—the plaintiff landowners sought compensation for a regulatory taking
under the Tucker Act, which fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFC.398
In Loveladies Harbor, the claims in the District Court to set aside the
administrative restriction and in the CFC for compensation for the loss of beneficial
use of the property were, in the words of legal scholar Craig Schwartz,
“necessarily sequential,”399 as is typical in the context of regulatory takings. In
Loveladies Harbor, the Federal Circuit held that § 1500 did not bar the CFC action
because the plaintiffs sought “distinctly different” relief in each suit—specific relief
under the APA in District Court (essentially seeking an injunction to set aside the
permit denial) and money damages under the Tucker Act in the CFC (seeking
compensation for the government’s taking of the property).400
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Tohono O’odham Nation plainly overturns the
Federal Circuit’s “distinctly different” relief rationale for avoiding the application
of § 1500, adopting instead the “same operative facts” trigger for the jurisdictional
bar.401 Whether the Loveladies Harbor scenario still triggers the jurisdictional bar
henceforth will turn on questions about whether both the preceding District Court
action and the subsequent CFC suit arise from “substantially the same operative
facts”402 and whether the invocation of a constitutional right to compensation
requires a different analysis.
In such regulatory takings cases, the government will focus on the single fact of
the administrative restriction on property use as giving rise both to the APA review
action and the Tucker Act takings claim. The government will argue that § 1500
applies if both suits are pending simultaneously because “the same conduct gave
rise to different claims based upon purportedly distinct legal theories.”403

394. 27 F.3d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
395. Id. at 1547.
396. See SISK, supra note 34, § 4.02(d)(5), at 244–45.
397. See id.
398. Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 27 F.3d at 1547.
399. Schwartz, supra note 239, at 5.
400. Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 27 F.3d at 1551.
401. See United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1731 (2011).
402. In Loveladies Harbor, the Federal Circuit assumed “arguendo, that Loveladies’ two
suits arise from the same operative facts.” 27 F.3d at 1552 (emphasis in original).
403. Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(describing general basis for applying § 1500 to dismiss parallel CFC claim brought under a
different legal theory); see also Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 17
(2011) (ordering dismissal under § 1500 because, while the plaintiff attempted “to separate
its claims into two different categories,” the plaintiff was “seeking redress for injuries arising
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Observing that the property at issue will be the same and government conduct
involved will be substantially the same, the government will insist that § 1500
plainly applies.404
Claimants against the government will contend that the presence of an
administrative restriction on property use is merely a background fact, while the
operative facts for the claims and the material evidence to prove the claims are
different.405 They will argue that the APA challenge to the property restriction in
District Court focuses on the statutory and regulatory constraints on agency action,
while the Tucker Act claim in the CFC addresses whether the owner was deprived
by the regulation of all economically beneficial use of the property and the just
compensation due for a taking of property.
In addition, Craig Schwartz contends that, even after Tohono O’odham Nation,
the CFC may stay and is not required to dismiss under § 1500 when the plaintiff
has filed a “necessarily sequential” action in District Court to preserve a
“substantial legal right.”406 In Tohono O’odham Nation, the Supreme Court rejected
claims of hardship by “forcing plaintiffs to choose between partial remedies
available in different courts,” saying that “[a]lthough Congress has permitted
claims against the United States for monetary relief in the CFC, that relief is
available by grace and not by right.”407 By contrast, as the Federal Circuit stated in
Loveladies Harbor, applying § 1500 there would place a plaintiff “in the position
of having to give up a substantial legal right protected by the Takings Clause of the
Constitution.”408
Nonetheless, an exception for regulatory taking cases is not to be found in the
text of § 1500 and was not suggested in Tohono O’odham Nation.409 Concurring in
the judgment, Justice Sotomayor observed that “[a]fter today’s decision, § 1500
may well prevent a plaintiff from pursuing a takings claim in the CFC if an action
to set aside the agency action is pending in district court.”410 The majority offered
from the same transaction or occurrence”); Eric Bruggink, A Model Proposal, 28 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 529, 538 (1999) (observing that a taking claim in the Court of Federal Claims may often
be the “flip side of a case brought in district court under the APA and section 1331 to
challenge the validity of administrative action”).
404. See Kingman Reef Atoll Inv., LLC v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 660, 691 (2012)
(holding that operative facts in quiet title suit in District Court and taking claim in CFC are
“virtually indistinguishable,” because “the allegations . . . as to . . . the asset at issue, are
substantially the same” and the “complaints also describe similar conduct supporting the
plaintiffs’ legal theories,” thus triggering § 1500).
405. See d’Abrera v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 51, 58 (2007) (“In short, if a material
factual difference exists between two claims, they are not the same for purposes of Section
1500.”).
406. Schwartz, supra note 239, at 5, 14 n.76, 18.
407. United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1730–31 (2011).
408. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en
banc); see also United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl.
180, 187 n.8 (2012) (stating that “Section 1500 remains inapplicable to dual claims filed to
preserve “a substantial legal right,’” and noting Schwartz’s “necessarily sequential” test as
possible way to identify such rights).
409. See Brandt v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 72, 80 n.8 (2011) (saying that “[n]either
Tohono nor the text of section 1500 make any distinction based on the type of claim” and
that both “govern equally Fifth Amendment takings claims”).
410. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1734 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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no response or contradiction.411 As the Federal Circuit explained in Hair v. United
States,412 in holding that taking claims are subject to the six-year statute of
limitations, “there is no merit to plaintiff’s argument that the constitutional right to
just compensation is absolute, any more than any other right is absolute.”413
Application of § 1500 to the sequential court filings in the regulatory taking
scenario need not deprive a claimant of just compensation due by constitutional
right, although it may sometimes require the claimant to surrender a statutory claim
(which arguably counts as “relief [that] is available by grace and not by right”414) to
preserve the constitutional claim. Filing suit in the CFC to seek compensation for a
constitutional taking under the Tucker Act, without filing or being required to
abandon a previous APA challenge to the agency’s action in District Court, would
constitute a concession that the agency’s regulatory action was valid but would not
undermine the claim to compensation for loss of property use.415 To be sure, the
forced election is a meaningful limitation on a plaintiff’s course of action, but
whether it crosses a constitutional line is less than certain.
Moreover, given the six-year statute of limitations period for CFC actions, a
plaintiff acting promptly to seek judicial review of agency action in the District
Court ordinarily will see its case rise or fall on the merits before needing to
consider an alternative vehicle for monetary compensation.416 Indeed, as pointed
out by the dissenting judge in Loveladies Harbor, the APA action in that case,
including the appeal, had been resolved in three years, meaning the plaintiff “still
would have had three years in which to file its claim in the Court of Federal
Claims . . . after the resolution of its challenge to the permit denial.”417
In the immediate aftermath of Tohono O’odham Nation, however, some
plaintiffs will get caught in the slamming door of § 1500, even though the
jurisdictional bar could have been avoided by waiting to file in the CFC until after
the final resolution of the parallel District Court litigation. For example, in Central
Pines Land Co. v. United States,418 the Court of Federal Claims noted that “had the
plaintiffs understood the impact of section 1500 as has since been expressed in
Tohono,” they either would not have filed suit in the CFC or would have dismissed
the original CFC action and waited until after completion of District Court
litigation before returning to the CFC.419 In such cases, the plaintiffs could have
avoided simultaneously pending lawsuits by filing them sequentially within
statutory time limitations. But, having instead assumed that duplicative litigation
was permissible, the plaintiffs now face unavoidable dismissal of the CFC suit.

411. But see Schwartz, supra note 239, at 20 n.116 (arguing that because Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion did not cite or repudiate Loveladies Harbor, “[t]he ‘substantial
legal right’ language from Loveladies Harbor remains good law”).
412. 350 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
413. Id. at 1260.
414. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1731.
415. See Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
416. But see Bremer & Siegel, supra note 388, at 50 (arguing that “the speed of
litigation . . . should not affect the ability to bring claims”).
417. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(Mayer, J., dissenting).
418. 99 Fed. Cl. 394 (2011).
419. Id. at 406.
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* * *
Importantly, in neither of the above scenarios—the possibility of a forced
election of theory or a forced election of remedy—is the complicating factor of
forum shopping directly implicated. In the Keene scenario, the plaintiffs could
pursue the FTCA claim only in District Court and could pursue the Tucker Act
claim only in the CFC—neither forum could hear the other claim as legally framed.
In the Loveladies Harbor scenario, the plaintiffs could only pursue the APA claim
in District Court and the Tucker Act claim in the CFC—again neither forum could
hear the other claim seeking a distinctly different remedy. Precisely because
plaintiffs in such circumstances are restricted to separate judicial venues for
pursuing alternative theories or remedies arising from the same factual nucleus,
§ 1500 may have real bite, and thus is understandably criticized as unfairly
depriving some claimants of a complete and just recovery.
A report for the Administrative Conference’s Judicial Review Committee,
prepared by Emily Schleicher Bremer and Jonathan Siegel, recommends that the
Administrative Conference propose the repeal of § 1500.420 Although Bremer and
Siegel acknowledge that repeal would permit some duplicative litigation against the
United States, they argue that plaintiffs should not be penalized for having to
pursue related claims in different courts because of jurisdictional limitations.421
When courts encounter such simultaneously pending cases, Bremer and Siegel
suggest they may apply preclusion rules and manage their dockets, such as by
staying one lawsuit until the resolution of the other, and thereby may “mitigate the
costs of such duplication.”422 Section 1500 is a trap for the unwary (especially, but
not only, pro se litigants and inexperienced lawyers) and does impose hardship in
some cases, thus meriting legislative reconsideration of whether it should be
retained in the modern litigation context.
But in the Tohono O’odham Nation case itself, the plaintiff brought the § 1500
problem on itself by engaging in forum shopping and fomenting a duplicative
litigation problem where it was not necessary. The question of the proper
jurisdictional home for an Indian breach of trust claim was not directly before the
Supreme Court in Tohono O’odham Nation. However, as discussed in the next
section of this Article, the Supreme Court’s majority decision in Tohono O’odham
Nation strongly suggests that the CFC was empowered to provide a full or at least

420. Bremer & Siegel, supra note 388, at 7. As of the date this Article was completed, the
Judicial Review Committee had approved a recommendation for the repeal of § 1500, proposing
to replace § 1500 with a statutory provision for a presumptive stay to avoid simultaneous
litigation of multiple cases arising out of the same operative facts. Comm. on Judicial Review,
U.S. Admin. Conf., Reform of 28 U.S.C. § 1500, Proposed Recommendation, available at
http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/plugins/download-monitor/download.php?id=748,
adopted by Comm. on Judicial Review, Meeting, Oct. 17, 2012, available at
http://acus.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=59. The recommendation is on
the agenda to be considered by the full Administrative Conference at its plenary session on
December 6, 2012, available at http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/plugins/downloadmonitor/download.php?id=747.
421. Bremer & Siegel, supra note 388, at 7, 37–38.
422. Id. at 7.
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adequate remedy by a money judgment and that duplicative litigation therefore was
easily avoided without meaningful hardship.
2. The Specific Implications of Tohono O’odham Nation for Forum Selection in
Indian Breach of Trust Cases
As discussed immediately above, by forcing an election of legal theory or
remedy in a manner that could deprive a claimant of a full or perhaps any recovery,
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 1500 in Tohono O’odham Nation may have
material and detrimental consequences for claimants against the federal
government in certain discrete contexts. But in the very legal context in which it
arose—Indian breach of trust claims—the Tohono O’odham Nation decision will
not force American Indian tribal and individual claimants into an election that
deprives them of a complete and healthy remedy against the federal government for
any breach of fiduciary duties. Instead, the Tohono O’odham Nation case highlights
the more fundamental question of the proper forum for a claim against the
sovereign United States and the risks of attempting to bypass the jurisdictional
limitations placed on claims against the United States.
a. Tohono O’odham Nation and the Proper Forum for a Breach of Trust Claim
The Tohono O’odham Nation case was an odd platform for deciding the § 1500
question.423 The Indian Nation filed a duplicative suit in a forum that lacked
jurisdiction to hear the claim at all—the District Court, which did not have proper
authority to hear what was a disguised Tucker Act claim.424 And the Nation could
have obtained a complete remedy in the proper forum—the Court of Federal
Claims, which could grant a money judgment with collateral equitable relief.425
With respect to the tribal claims in the two parallel lawsuits in Tohono O’odham
Nation, the government’s position has been that the breach of trust action filed in
the CFC should be dismissed under § 1500, because of the pendency of the parallel
breach of trust action in the District Court,426 and that the Nation’s action in the
District Court should be dismissed on jurisdictional, sovereign immunity, and other
grounds.427 The government thereby sought to reduce the number of lawsuits from
two to zero. The Nation responded that both the CFC and the District Court

423. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 25–26, United States v. Tohono O’odham
Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011) (No. 09-846) (Scalia, J.) (noting that, since “it’s far from
clear if [the Tohono O’odham Nation] had any business being in the district court anyway,”
the Court was being asked to “resolv[e] a very strange question,” that, if there is a right to
sue in District Court for an injunction, “as is not clear,” how does § 1500 apply “when there
is a suit pending in the Court of Claims and that is sort of an abstract question”).
424. See supra Part II.A, B.2–3.
425. See supra Part II.B.2.
426. See Brief for Petitioner at 14, 48, United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S.
Ct. 1723 (No. 09-846).
427. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss at 10–60, Tohono O’odham Nation v. Kempthorne, No. 06-2236-JR (D.D.C. June
16, 2008).
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lawsuits should be permitted to proceed along separate courses and conclude with
dual judgments.428 Thus, the Nation had hoped to maintain two lawsuits.
The Supreme Court rejected the Tohono O’odham Nation’s attempt to maintain
two lawsuits and thus accepted the government’s position, at least in part. The
continued viability of the District Court action remained an open question.
Throughout this Article, I have maintained that the District Court lacks authority
under the APA to hear Indian breach of trust lawsuits and that claim-splitting
between federal courts contradicts the congressional purpose to centralize monetary
claims in general and Indian breach of trust claims in particular in the CFC and the
Federal Circuit. Accordingly, while a tribe is entitled to maintain one lawsuit, that
single lawsuit should be placed in or moved to the CFC. Indian breach of trust
claims filed in District Court action should be transferred to the CFC for unified
adjudication under the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act.
In Tohono O’odham Nation, the Supreme Court reviewed a judgment by the
CFC and necessarily focused on the § 1500 jurisdictional bar as applied to the CFC.
Because the parallel District Court action was not before it, the Supreme Court did
not directly address the District Court’s jurisdiction over a breach of trust claim.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court majority opinion casts doubt on the viability of a
District Court action for such tribal claims and confirms the propriety of the CFC
remedy. In responding to the Nation’s claim of hardship by supposedly being
“forc[ed] . . . to choose between partial remedies available in different courts,” the
majority said: “The hardship in this case is far from clear. The Nation could have
filed in the CFC alone and if successful obtained monetary relief to compensate for
any losses caused by the Government’s breach of duty.”429 The clear import of the
statement, which arguably is not dictum because it was part of the reasoning behind
the Court’s construction of § 1500, is that a money judgment in the CFC would be
a full and not merely “partial” remedy.
In response, the concurrence noted that the plaintiff sought an “equitable
accounting” in the District Court and observed that, more than forty years ago, the
CFC’s predecessor had held it “lacks jurisdiction to issue a preliability
accounting.”430 Importantly, however, the concurring justices acknowledged that,
more recently, the Federal Circuit had suggested the availability of an accounting in
the CFC through its “ancillary relief” authority.431 (This additional remedial power
was granted by Congress subsequent to that earlier Court of Claims decision
disavowing power to order a preliability accounting.432)
Moreover, given that the Nation was alleging a past breach of trust with past
economic harm—in both the District Court and CFC—the availability of a
“preliability” accounting remedy was beside the point. In typical Indian breach of
trust litigation, tribes or tribe members do not contend that the government simply

428. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 18, at 16–17.
429. United States v.Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1730–31 (2011).
430. Id. at 1735 n.5 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Klamath &
Moduc Tribes v. United States, 174 Ct. Cl. 483, 487–88, 490 (1966)).
431. Id. (citing Eastern Shawnee Tribe v. United States, 582 F.3d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
2009)).
432. See Remand Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-415, 86 Stat. 652 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(2) (2006).).
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failed to provide a periodic statement or annual report, that is, they do not claim
that the government’s failure is merely one of omission in not disclosing
information. Rather, Native American plaintiffs in trust account cases invariably
argue that the government has breached its fiduciary duty by mismanaging the trust
accounts such that the statements of balances do not accurately reflect the true
amounts and that funds have not been properly invested, resulting in financial
injury. In other words, the claims already are post-liability. And the ability of the
CFC to account for the retrospective harm caused by the government’s breach of
fiduciary duties is not truly in dispute.
The question upon which the District Court’s jurisdiction over an Indian breach
of trust claim under the APA hinges is whether there is an “adequate remedy”433 in
another court, such as the CFC. The Supreme Court majority in Tohono O’odham
Nation saw the money judgment remedy in the CFC for the breach of trust as
dispelling any tribal claim of hardship by being left to a partial remedy. In sum, the
monetary compensation due to a successful tribal plaintiff under the Indian Tucker
Act (and collateral equitable relief available to the CFC under the Remand Act)
plainly counts as an “adequate” remedy and thus supersedes an alternative recourse
to the APA.
b. Implications for Tribes That Filed Breach of Trust Claims Only in Court of
Federal Claims
What then lies ahead for Indian tribes and tribe members who wish to pursue
breach of trust claims against the United States?
For those Native American plaintiffs who file or have filed breach of trust suits
solely in the CFC, they have chosen the wiser course and the Tohono O’odham
Nation decision confirms their wisdom. If their claims are successful on the merits
(by establishing a fiduciary relationship and proving a breach and damages), they
can obtain a full remedy in the CFC and do so in a single lawsuit. They may
recover both (1) a money judgment for any financial harm, by reason of
misallocation of funds, mismanagement of resources, failure to properly invest or
seek a profit on funds or resources, etc.; and (2) an accounting or its equivalent of
pertinent tribal assets through discovery and the CFC’s collateral equitable powers
to order the correction of records or remand the matter to administrative or
executive bodies or officials with directions to reconcile accounts.434
Moreover, those tribes that have brought a single action in the CFC may rest
easy that they have not thereby surrendered an accounting remedy of broader
scope, which might have been available in the District Court. After the Jicarilla
Apache ruling, a cause of action for an equitable accounting outside of statutory
limits is no longer cognizable in District Court.435 Indeed, even if viable in the
District Court under the APA directly, a claim for accounting only, that is, a claim
solely for information and reconciliation, is limited by Jicarilla Apache to the
specific statutory guidelines governing disclosure of trust account information and

433. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
434. See supra Part II.B.2.
435. See supra Part II.B.3.b.
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reconciliation of balances436 and likely may not be augmented by restitutionary
claims that seek an infusion of money.437 By contrast, the CFC may well have
broader authority to secure evidence about trust account handling or the
government’s actions with respect to non-monetary assets, when adjudicating a
breach of trust action under the Tucker Act or Indian Tucker Act.438 And, of course,
the CFC may award a money judgment for past financial harm, however
formulated in theory or remedy.439
c. Implications for Tribes Considering Forum in Which to File Breach of Trust
Claims in the Future (Order-of-Filing Rule)
For those Native American plaintiffs who plan to file future Indian breach of
trust suits, they would be well-advised to go directly to the CFC and file a single
suit for a full remedy under the Tucker Act or the Indian Tucker Act. Attempting to
bypass the CFC by an APA suit in the District Court is a risky course that is likely
to be foreclosed altogether by the Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit, sooner or
later. And, again, even if viable in District Court, an APA action for an accounting
is now limited by the specific statutory guidelines on disclosure of information
about trust funds. The scope of breach of trust litigation in the CFC is at least as
broad and likely much broader.
Nor should tribes or tribe members in the future assume they may file
simultaneous lawsuits in both the CFC and the District Court by simply reversing
the order of filing (the so-called Tecon rule), attempting to rely on prior Federal
Circuit precedent that the CFC does not lose jurisdiction to continue under § 1500
when a parallel District Court suit is filed afterward.440 Although the Supreme
Court in Tohono O’odham Nation did not reach the question,441 many observers
believe the handwriting for the Tecon exception is on the wall.442
Advocates for a time-of-filing interpretation of § 1500 observe that the
predecessor statute “proscribed both filing and prosecuting any claim,” but that
subsequent amendments removed that language, so that “the statute no longer
contains a proscription against prosecuting a claim.”443 Critics of the Tecon rule
respond that the “prosecuting” phrase was replaced by jurisdictional language with
the codification of Title 28 of the United States Code in 1948,444 which the code
reviser characterized as a mere change in “phraseology only” without substantive

436. See supra Part II.B.3.c.
437. See supra Part II.B.3.d.
438. See supra Part II.B.3.c.
439. See supra Part II.B.1.a, 3.d.
440. See supra notes 358–359 and accompanying text.
441. United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1729–30 (2011).
442. See Bremer & Siegel, supra note 388, at 49 (“[T]he Supreme Court, in its recent
Tohono decision, suggested (without holding) that it disapproves of the time-of-filing rule.”).
443. UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Plager, J.,
dissenting), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Keene Corp. v United States, 508 U.S. 200
(1993). The original predecessor statute read that “no person shall file or prosecute any
claim” in the then-Court of Claims if other suit or process on the same claim was pending in
another court. Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 71, § 8, 15 Stat. 75, 77.
444. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 942.
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change.445 With specific reference to § 1500, the Supreme Court has said that, in
the “comprehensive revision of the Judicial Code completed in 1948, we do not
presume that the revision worked a change in the underlying substantive law
‘unless an intent to make such [a] chang[e] is clearly expressed.’”446
Supporters of the Tecon rule read the words “has pending” in § 1500447 as
“constitut[ing] a present participle which ‘convey[s] the same meaning’ as the
present perfect tense and ‘indicates action that was started in the past and has
recently been completed or is continuing up to the present time.’”448 On this line of
reasoning, it is argued, the plain meaning “calls for a determination of the order in
which two or more suits were filed.”449
That, however, begs the question of what is the pertinent “present time.” Is it the
date of the filing of the suit in the CFC or the date on which a suit is later filed in
District Court (prompting a government motion to dismiss under § 1500)?
Indeed, the opponents of the order-of-filing exception read the very same “has
pending” language as barring continuing jurisdiction in the CFC without making
any “distinction . . . concerning the time of filing of that other suit.”450 In addition,
§ 1500 directs that the CFC “shall not have jurisdiction,”451 using a present tense
verb for describing the CFC’s authority to hear a matter when an action arising
from the same claim has been filed in another court.452
Looking to the general law of subject matter jurisdiction, a plausible argument
could be made for the order-of-filing exception. Under some other jurisdictional
statutes, the pertinent point in time for determining federal court jurisdiction is the
time of filing.453 Thus, under the “well-pleaded complaint rule” that governs

445. UNR, 962 F.2d at 1019 (citing Historical and Revision Notes, 28 U.S.C. § 1500
(2006)).
446. Keene Corp., 508 U.S. at 209 (alterations in original) (quoting Fourco Glass Co. v.
Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227 (1957)); Anderson v. Pac. Coast S.S. Co., 225
U.S. 187, 198–99 (1912); see also Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist
Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 279 (2003) (“The legislative
history described revisions of Title 28 in general as stylistic rather than substantive, aimed at
ending needless searches into the Statutes at Large, eliminating anachronistic provisions, and
simplifying language.”); Gregory C. Sisk, Lifting the Blindfold From Lady Justice: Allowing
Judges to See the Structure in the Judicial Code, 62 FLA. L. REV. 457, 464 (2010) (referring
to “the general presumption that changes made during a codification are for purposes of
clarification, unless clear indication is present that a change in meaning was intended”).
447. 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (prohibiting the Court of Federal Claims from exercising
jurisdiction “of any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff . . . has pending in any other
court any suit or process against the United States ”) (emphasis added).
448. Nez Perce Tribe v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 186, 189 (2008) (alteration in original)
(quoting WILLIAM A. SABIN, THE GREGG REFERENCE MANUAL §§ 1033–34, at 272–73 (10th
ed. 2005)).
449. Id.
450. Schwartz, supra note 353, at 594.
451. 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (2006) (emphasis added).
452. See United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 183,
188 (2009) (describing the government’s § 1500 argument that “the phrase ‘have
jurisdiction’ is a present tense verb”).
453. But see Smith v. Orr, 855 F.2d 1544, 1552–53 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that,
although the plaintiff’s claim for back pay did not exceed $10,000 when filed in District
Court, but then subsequently accrued above $10,000, “the district court lost jurisdiction over
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federal-question jurisdiction, jurisdiction attaches or fails immediately upon the
filing of the plaintiff’s complaint, which must raise a federal law issue as part of the
affirmative cause of action, without regard to federal law issues later raised by the
defendant.454 For diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction, the domicile of the parties at
the time the complaint is filed controls, such that jurisdiction is not created or lost
even if the parties change domicile afterward.455
Extended to § 1500, then, if there is no other suit pending when the CFC action
is filed, application of this general rule would mean that CFC jurisdiction attaches
and will not be divested by subsequent events, such as a later-filed action in District
Court. Moreover, as observed by one judge on the Court of Federal Claims in
Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. United States,456 this interpretation of § 1500 would
preclude “forum manipulation” by a plaintiff who “becomes unhappy with the
course of litigation” 457 in the CFC and then tries to divest the CFC of continuing
jurisdiction by filing a parallel action in the District Court.
However, each jurisdictional statute must be read according to its own terms and
congressional purpose. As a withdrawal rather than a grant of jurisdiction, § 1500
arguably should be approached from a different perspective. When a District Court
assumes jurisdiction under the federal-question or diversity-of-citizenship statutes,
the general rule that jurisdiction is not later lost because of a post-filing change of
circumstances does not prevent those statutes from serving their fundamental
purposes. By contrast, treating § 1500 as turning on timing converts the operation
of the statute into a jurisdictional game and makes its application chimerical.458 As
Craig Schwartz writes, not only is the order-of-filing interpretation of § 1500
“entirely at odds with its intended purpose,” but “[p]erversely, it encourages
plaintiffs to double-file in order to preserve access to the CFC.”459
As a contrasting statutory example, consider the supplemental jurisdiction
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which authorizes the District Court to hear certain claims
without an independent jurisdictional basis if those claims “form part of the same
case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution” that is the
basis for the federal court’s original jurisdiction.460 However, continuing exercise
of jurisdiction by the District Court over supplemental claims may be declined
based on events subsequent to filing, such as when “the district court has dismissed
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”461 Thus, while the jurisdictional
his claim when it exceeded this amount”).
454. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); see also JACK
H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.4, at 23 (4th
ed. 2005) (“Given the limited nature of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, it is essential that
the existence of jurisdiction be determined at the outset, rather than being contingent upon
what may occur at later stages in the litigation. By demanding that a federal issue be raised in
the complaint, the [well-pleaded complaint] rule accomplishes this goal.”).
455. Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n.1 (1957).
456. 102 Fed. Cl. 17 (2011).
457. Id. at 24.
458. See Tohono O’odham Nation v. United States, 559 F.3d 1284, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(acknowledging that “merely require[ing] that the plaintiff file its action in the Court of
Federal Claims before it files its district court complaint” is an “anomalous rule”) (emphasis
in original), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011).
459. Schwartz, supra note 239, at 24.
460. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006).
461. Id. § 1367(c)(3).
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power to hear a supplemental claim “ordinarily was determined on the pleadings,
the question whether to exercise that power remained open throughout the
litigation.”462 Just as the efficiency raison d'être for adjudicating a state-law
supplemental jurisdiction claim typically falls away when the underlying federalquestion jurisdiction claim is dismissed before trial, the purpose of § 1500 in
relieving both the federal government and the courts from the burdens of
simultaneous, duplicative litigation may be triggered when a District Court action
is later filed while a case arising from the same operative facts is still before the
CFC.
In Tohono O’odham Nation, the Supreme Court rejected a “different remedy”
exception to § 1500 by saying that it would turn the provision into “a mere pleading
rule, to be circumvented by carving up a single transaction into overlapping pieces
seeking different relief.”463 Treating § 1500 as “a mere time-of-filing rule” that
could be “circumvented” by arranging to file the CFC lawsuit one day, or even a
few hours, before filing the District Court lawsuit makes the provision arbitrary.464
Given the Court’s description of the statute’s manifest purpose to “save the
Government from burdens of redundant litigation,” notably including the costs of
“[d]iscovery . . . and the preparation and examination of witnesses at trial,”465 that
purpose would be undermined if a party could maintain duplicative litigation
against the United States whenever it carefully timed one lawsuit to start before the
other.466 And, while stopping short of deciding the issue in that case, the Tohono

462. FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., supra note 454 § 2.12, at 75 (describing pendent jurisdiction
practice that was later codified in § 1367(c)).
463. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1730.
464. In the CFC, the majority rule is that the Tecon exception applies whenever the
sequence of filing establishes that the CFC action was filed earlier on the same day as the
District Court action was filed, proven by time stamps or testimony from filing clerks or
paralegals. See United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl.
183, 190–91 (2009) (describing the division on this question among the judges of the CFC).
465. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1730.
466. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 197, 215 (1987) (“Whether a suit on the
same claim is filed before or after an action in the . . . Claims Court, the Government’s
defense of it involves duplicative effort.”). However, in Kaw Nation of Oklahoma v. United
States, 103 Fed. Cl. 613, 622 (2012), the court observed that “if jurisdiction here is not
measured when a suit is filed, one must wonder why a plaintiff in this court cannot avoid
section 1500 simply by dismissing the related district court action before defendant files a
motion to dismiss.” In Keene, the Supreme Court held that § 1500 applied when the District
Court lawsuit was pending when the CFC suit was instituted, even though the District Court
lawsuit was subsequently dismissed while the CFC litigation remained pending. Keene Corp.
v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207–09 (1993). The strongest answer to this observation
would be to interpret § 1500 as meaning that the CFC irrevocably loses jurisdiction at the
point in time that duplicative litigation emerges in another court, whether that litigation
arises immediately on the date of filing in the CFC or arrives subsequently. With the
animating purpose of § 1500 being to avoid the burdens of duplicative litigation, those
burdens are imposed whenever the District Court action is initiated and overlaps in time with
the CFC action. The burden of duplicative litigation having been realized, the burden cannot
be undone by a subsequent dismissal of the District Court action. Thus, having lost
jurisdiction at the moment in time that duplication of litigation against the government
occurs, the CFC cannot regain jurisdiction, even if the District Court action is dismissed
before the CFC acknowledges its loss of jurisdiction by granting the motion to dismiss.
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O’odham Nation Court faulted the Federal Circuit for relying on precedents,
specifically noting the Tecon order-of-filing decision, “that left the statute without
meaningful force.”467
d. Implications for Tribes That Filed Duplicative Breach of Trust Claims in the
District Court and the Court of Federal Claims
For those tribes that have filed duplicative lawsuits in the wake of Cobell, the
path forward is not clearly marked. I am optimistic that by changing course and
bringing those breach of trust claims home to the CFC, those tribes still may obtain
a complete remedy, even if settlement with the United States is not forthcoming.468
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Tohono O’odham Nation obviously requires
dismissal of the CFC version of breach of trust claims when another version is
pending in District Court. The question remains whether the District Court vehicle
for a breach of trust claim remains viable, in one way or another. Even if the
District Court action is not precluded by limitations in the APA or by the
exclusivity of the Indian Tucker Act remedy in the CFC, the District Court likely
lacks authority to award monetary relief, however framed, and certainly cannot
award monetary relief that is compensatory in nature.
First, although uncertain to succeed, tribes in the position of previously having
filed duplicative suits may decide to stick it out, await the conclusion of the District
Court litigation, and then attempt to follow up with successive litigation in the
CFC, despite the passage of time. In Tohono O’odham Nation, the Supreme Court
majority raised the possibility that the statute of limitations for bringing an action in
the CFC might be tolled, although the Court hedged that bet. The majority observed
“Congress has provided in every appropriations Act for the Department of Interior
since 1990 that the statute of limitations on Indian trust mismanagement claims
shall not run until the affected tribe has been given an appropriate accounting.”469
However, in its concluding passage, the Court made plain that this was not a
definitive ruling, saying that the tribe could re-file a claim in the CFC “if the statute
of limitations is no bar.” 470
Given that the tribes have asserted failure by the government to provide an
“appropriate accounting” in their District Court actions, if they were to succeed on

467. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1729 (citing Tecon Engineers, Inc. v. United
States, 170 Ct. Cl. 389 (1965)).
468. Of course, the matter may always be resolved by settlement. As discussed
previously, in April 2012, forty-one tribes settled their claims with the United States,
although more than sixty other tribal claims were still proceeding. See supra notes 349–350
and accompanying text. Prior to that settlement, seventy-six tribes that had filed breach of
trust claims involving tribal trust fund accounts in the CFC and/or District Court were
engaged in confidential settlement discussions with the United States. See Parties’ Joint
Stipulation and Order Regarding Confidentiality of Settlement Discussions and
Communications, Tohono O’odham Nation v. Salazar, No. 06-CV-2236-JR (D.D.C. Aug.
25, 2011).
469. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1731 (citing, e.g., Act of Oct. 30, 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-88, 123 Stat. 2904, 2922; Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-512, 104 Stat.
1915, 1930).
470. Id. (emphasis added).
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the merits, then by definition the statute of limitations would not run until the
government has corrected those errors. In light of the Supreme Court’s later ruling
in Jicarilla Apache, which narrows the scope of information that a tribe may
demand from the government to that which the trust account statutes specifically
prescribe,471 the government may respond that the periodic reports already provided
to the tribes, perhaps even if they contain errors, constitute the “appropriate
accounting” contemplated by Congress.472 If the government’s position is accepted,
then the statute of limitations has long been running. Moreover, the concurring
justices in Tohono O’odham Nation noted that the appropriations statute tolling the
statute of limitations for CFC claims by tribes only applies to trust fund claims and
“does not appear to toll the statute of limitations for claims concerning assets other
than funds, such as tangible assets.”473
Second, and the better course of action in my view, tribes that have filed
duplicative lawsuits in both the District Court and the CFC should reconsider and
change course in light of these new Supreme Court and Federal Circuit
jurisdictional rulings. They now should seek to transfer the District Court actions to
the CFC. In this way, the tribes would preserve their one remaining lawsuit and be
able to prosecute it to a more complete judgment under the Indian Tucker Act.
Even though the previous CFC action has been dismissed under § 1500, the
pending District Court action could be transferred to the CFC under § 1631 of Title
28474 and arrive as effectively a new filing (but with the statute of limitations
having been tolled by the earlier filing of the District Court action).
To be sure, § 1631 is not a permissive transfer statute and thus allows movement
of the case from the District Court to the CFC only if the District Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction. Based on the Cobell precedent in the District of
Columbia federal courts, the tribes thus far have been insisting that jurisdiction
properly lies in the District Court.475 If they so choose, however, the tribes could
fairly argue to the District Court that the jurisdictional landscape has changed with
Tohono O’odham Nation and Jicarilla Apache.
Even if the District Court were unwilling to grant a transfer, feeling still bound
by the Cobell precedent, the tribe and the government both could appeal the denial
of a transfer under the special interlocutory appeal provision in § 1292(d)(4) of
Title 28.476 That appeal lies to the Federal Circuit, not to the D.C. Circuit, and the
Federal Circuit almost surely would order the case transferred to the CFC.477 In the
end, however winding may be the path, a single lawsuit for breach of trust
eventually should find its way to the CFC.

471. See supra Part II.B.3.
472. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss at 2, 27, Tohono O’odham Nation v. Kempthorne, No. 06-2236-JR (D.D.C. June 16,
2008) (arguing that the government’s specific duties to reconcile tribal trust accounts as
required by the 1994 statute were satisfied in 1996).
473. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1735 n.5 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
474. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2006).
475. See supra Part II.A.
476. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4) (2006).
477. See supra Parts I.C, II.B.2.
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Under the Federal Circuit’s ruling in United States v. County of Cook,478 § 1500
would bar the CFC from taking jurisdiction if only part of the District Court action
were transferred under § 1631, while the District Court retained another part. 479
The result of a partial transfer would be duplicative and simultaneously pending
claims in both courts. Accordingly, the transfer option for restoring Indian breach
of trust plaintiffs to a complete remedy would require transfer of the entire District
Court proceeding to the CFC, to then proceed as the sole action, the nature and
scope of which presumably could be clarified and supplemented by appropriate
amendments to the pleadings in the CFC that would relate-back under civil
procedure rules.
If the tribes are reluctant to take this course, the United States always has had
the power to cut to the jurisdictional chase by filing a motion under § 1631 to
transfer tribal suits now pending in the District Court. Even if the District Court
should deny the motion to transfer, the government would be empowered to take an
interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit under § 1292(d)(4)(A).480 And because
the Federal Circuit already has signaled its agreement that Indian breach of trust
claims can be remedied by a money judgment and should be heard in the CFC, the
transfer would be successfully accomplished.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation well
illustrates the dangers of seeking to bypass the Court of Federal Claims by seeking
relief in the wrong place and by disguising what is essentially a claim for money as
something else. By departing from established jurisprudence—that Indian breach of
trust claims involving the federal government’s fiduciary administration of Native
American assets and funds are to be brought in the Court of Federal Claims—the
District Court for the District of Columbia created the conditions conducive to a
jurisdictional conflagration. As dozens of American Indian tribes filed duplicative
suits in both the District Courts and the Court of Federal Claims, a jurisdictional
collision became inevitable and the impact will resonate for years to come.
Given that the CFC has ample powers to afford a rich set of remedies in Indian
breach of trust and similar cases, including both a money judgment and collateral
equitable-type relief, tribal plaintiffs’ attempts at forum shopping were unnecessary
and unwise. If the courts continue to confirm the traditional and exclusive
jurisdiction of the CFC over claims that can be adequately remedied by a money
judgment (and collateral relief), then claimants will have no reason to file parallel
lawsuits purportedly seeking different relief in multiple courts. At least with respect

478. 170 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
479. Id. at 1087, 1090.
480. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4)(A). In fact, the United States did move for a transfer to
the CFC in one of the multiple breach of trust claims filed by tribes in District Court for the
District of Columbia. See Osage Tribe of Indians v. United States, No. CIVA04-0283(RCL),
2005 WL 578171, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2005). However, the government subsequently
dismissed its appeal to the Federal Circuit, Order Dismissing Appeal, Osage Tribe of Indians
v. United States, No. 05-1383 (Fed. Cir. July 8, 2005), thereby pretermitting early resolution
of the jurisdictional question by the appellate court designated by Congress.
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to Indian breach of trust cases, the jurisdictional fog will lift and the problem of
duplicative litigation will evaporate.
Through this ongoing clarification of jurisdictional lines and respect for the
institutional integrity of the CFC, the path to a single Tucker Act suit for claims
grounded in financial disputes, such as Indian breach of trust claims, will be even
more clearly marked. When “[a]t bottom it is a suit for money,” then “the Court of
Federal Claims can provide an adequate remedy, and it therefore belongs in that
court.”481

481. Suburban Mortg. Assocs., v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 480 F.3d 1116,
1118 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

